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MDL IN THE STATES 
Zachary D. Clopton & D. Theodore Rave 
ABSTRACT—Multidistrict litigation (MDL) is exploding. MDL makes up a 
large and increasing portion of the federal civil docket. It has been used in 
recent years to manage and resolve some of our largest controversies: 
opioids, NFL concussions, Volkswagen “clean” diesel, and many more. 
And, given its growing importance, MDL has come to dominate the 
academic literature on complex litigation. 
At its base, MDL is a tool to coordinate related cases across different 
courts in service of justice, efficiency, and fairness. These goals are not 
unique to the federal courts. State courts handle far more cases than federal 
courts, including the kinds of complex disputes that could benefit from 
coordination. Yet state MDL procedures are virtually absent from the 
scholarly literature. 
This Article offers a systematic study of state MDLs. Surveying the 
laws of every state, we find that about half the states have developed their 
own MDL-like procedural devices. What makes MDL distinctive is that it 
allows some official or institution to consolidate cases and to assign them to 
a handpicked judge. Therefore, we develop in this Article the first taxonomy 
of state MDL mechanisms based on which officials or institutions are given 
this substantial power. Along the way, we explore the other ways that states 
have tailored their MDL rules. We also provide case studies of three state 
MDL systems and report previously unpublished data on how state MDLs 
work. 
Building on these findings, this Article offers an institutional analysis 
of state MDL. We find that state MDLs distribute important cases to courts 
and judges in ways that depart dramatically from the default rules of judicial 
administration. These choices have important consequences for litigant 
control, judicial power, and both inter- and intrastate relations, which can be 
amplified in states where judges are elected. In these ways, different types 
of state MDLs—sometimes unwittingly—may tilt the usual balance in favor 
of plaintiffs or defendants, local actors or statewide ones, and voters or 
government officials. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Imagine a major storm causes damage to thousands of homes. As is 
often the case, a wave of insurance litigation follows in its wake. 
Homeowners file hundreds of cases in dozens of courts alleging that 
insurance companies relied on unlawful procedures when denying or 
reducing insurance claims. There could be many advantages to coordinating 
this mass of cases, especially if there is a good chance that they will be 
resolved together in a global settlement. At the very least, duplicative 
discovery and inconsistent judgments could be avoided if the cases could be 
consolidated in front of a single judge. But which judge? And how is that 
judge selected? 
As every lawyer knows, the answers to these questions matter 
tremendously. Judges vary along many important dimensions. Some judges 
are active case managers; others let the parties run the show. Some are pushy 
about settling cases; others love taking cases to trial. Some are plaintiff-
friendly; others sympathize with defendants. And because so much mass 
litigation ends in settlement, most of their decisions will never be subject to 
meaningful appellate review. 
In federal courts, related cases like these can be consolidated in a 
multidistrict litigation (MDL). The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation 
(JPML), a panel of seven federal judges selected by the Chief Justice of the 
United States, is authorized to consolidate cases and transfer them to a single 
handpicked judge for coordinated pretrial proceedings.1 MDL has come to 
dominate the federal civil docket, and it has been used to manage and resolve 
some of our largest controversies, such as the BP oil-spill disaster, the NFL 
concussion litigation, and the Volkswagen “clean”-diesel scandal.2 The 
federal MDL process is well studied and well understood.3 And, perhaps 
 
 1 See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a), (d). 
 2 By some (potentially misleading) estimates, MDL accounts for nearly 50% of the entire federal 
civil docket. See Zachary D. Clopton, MDL as Category, 105 CORNELL L. REV. 1297, 1305, 1314–16 
(2020) [hereinafter Clopton, MDL as Category] (citing sources and questioning this statistic). For more 
rigorous estimates, see generally Margaret S. Williams, The Effect of Multidistrict Litigation on the 
Federal Judiciary over the Past 50 Years, 53 GA. L. REV. 1245 (2019). For an excellent history of the 
MDL statute and overview of the procedure, see generally Andrew D. Bradt, “A Radical Proposal”: The 
Multidistrict Litigation Act of 1968, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 831 (2017).  
 3 Because federal MDL is well-studied and well-understood, there are too many sources to cite here. 
For a selection of recent articles that informed this project, see, for example, Lynn A. Baker & Stephen 
J. Herman, Layers of Lawyers: Parsing the Complexities of Claimant Representation in Mass Tort MDLs, 
24 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 469 (2020); Bradt, supra note 2; Andrew D. Bradt & D. Theodore Rave, The 
Information-Forcing Role of the Judge in Multidistrict Litigation, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 1259 (2017) 
[hereinafter Bradt & Rave, The Information-Forcing Role]; Andrew D. Bradt & D. Theodore Rave, It’s 
Good to Have the “Haves” on Your Side: A Defense of Repeat Players in Multidistrict Litigation, 
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surprisingly given the stakes of some of these controversies, the best 
evidence so far suggests that the consolidation process operates in a largely 
nonpartisan way.4 Thus, the federal courts have rather successfully 
formalized the consolidation of related cases from around the country. 
But what if these same cases were pending in state courts or were 
divided up between federal and state courts? State courts handle more than 
sixty times as many cases as federal courts, including the types of mass 
disputes that could benefit from coordination.5 Yet the various ways that 
states handle MDL-like litigation have been virtually absent from the 
scholarly literature.6 
This lack of attention is not because states simply mirror the federal 
courts. Many state MDL procedures differ dramatically from federal MDL 
procedures and from each other. And these differences can be magnified 
because, in many states, judges are elected to represent local or statewide 
constituencies. So, in addition to all the ways that any two MDL judges may 
differ, state MDLs also interact with electoral politics. Some of the elected 
 
108 GEO. L.J. 73 (2019) [hereinafter Bradt & Rave, It’s Good to Have the “Haves”]; ELIZABETH 
CHAMBLEE BURCH, MASS TORT DEALS: BACKROOM BARGAINING IN MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION (2019) 
[hereinafter BURCH, MASS TORT DEALS]; Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Monopolies in Multidistrict 
Litigation, 70 VAND. L. REV. 67 (2017) [hereinafter Burch, Monopolies]; Elizabeth Chamblee Burch & 
Margaret S. Williams, Repeat Players in Multidistrict Litigation: The Social Network, 102 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1445 (2017); Zachary D. Clopton & Andrew D. Bradt, Party Preferences in Multidistrict Litigation, 
107 CALIF. L. REV. 1713 (2019) [hereinafter Clopton & Bradt, Party Preferences]; Abbe R. Gluck, 
Unorthodox Civil Procedure: Modern Multidistrict Litigation’s Place in the Textbook Understandings of 
Procedure, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1669 (2017); Linda S. Mullenix, Aggregate Litigation and the Death of 
Democratic Dispute Resolution, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 511 (2013); Judith Resnik, “Vital” State Interests: 
From Representative Actions for Fair Labor Standards to Pooled Trusts, Class Actions, and MDLs in the 
Federal Courts, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1765 (2017); Charles Silver & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Quasi-class 
Action Method of Managing Multi-district Litigations: Problems and a Proposal, 63 VAND. L. REV. 107 
(2010); Margaret S. Williams & Tracey E. George, Who Will Manage Complex Civil Litigation? The 
Decision to Transfer and Consolidate Multidistrict Litigation, 10 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 424 (2013). 
 4 See Andrew D. Bradt & Zachary D. Clopton, MDL v. Trump: The Puzzle of Public Law in 
Multidistrict Litigation, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 905, 925–27 (2018) [hereinafter Bradt & Clopton, MDL v. 
Trump]. 
 5 NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS., CIVIL JUSTICE INITIATIVE: THE LANDSCAPE OF CIVIL LITIGATION IN 
STATE COURTS 6 n.36 (2015), https://www.ncsc.org/_data/assets/pdf_file/0020/13376/civiljusticerepot-
2015.pdf [perma.cc/RG2S-45E4] (first citing NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS., EXAMINING THE WORK OF 
STATE COURTS: AN OVERVIEW OF 2013 STATE COURT CASELOADS (2015); and then citing Table C. U.S. 
District Courts—Civil Cases Commenced, Terminated, and Pending During the 12-Month Periods 
Ending December 31, 2013 and 2014, U.S. CTS. https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/c00dec14. 
pdf [https://perma.cc/5N4K-STQ3]).  
 6 The best existing treatment of state MDL procedures is a seventeen-year-old treatise that is out of 
print: MARK HERRMANN, GEOFFREY J. RITTS & KATHERINE LARSON, STATEWIDE COORDINATED 
PROCEEDINGS: STATE COURT ANALOGUES TO THE FEDERAL MDL PROCESS (2d ed. 2004). We cite the 
handful of other exceptions focusing on one state or another in Parts II and III, infra. 
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state judges will be Democrats, others Republicans. Some will have to cater 
to big-city voters, others to rural constituents. Some will have received 
sizeable campaign contributions from plaintiffs’ lawyers, others from big 
businesses, including insurance companies. Again, it matters greatly which 
judge manages the consolidated proceeding and how that judge is selected.  
To be more concrete, imagine the insurance cases from the hypothetical 
storm were pending in Texas state courts. Indeed, this situation is based on 
a real set of Texas state cases.7 Texas has an MDL statute that would allow 
these cases to be brought together for coordinated proceedings.8 The power 
to consolidate, and with it the power to assign the consolidated cases to a 
particular judge, is vested in a panel of judges appointed by the state’s elected 
chief justice. The Texas chief justice has been a Republican—and has 
appointed a Republican-majority panel—for the entire existence of Texas 
MDL.9 It goes without saying that empowering a statewide panel of elected 
judges to reallocate important cases from one locally elected trial judge to 
another has significant consequences for litigants, voters, and intrastate 
relations.10 
Had the same events happened in Indiana, however, they would have 
played out differently than in Texas or the federal courts. In Indiana, the 
decision whether to consolidate related cases is vested in the locally elected 
trial judge with whom the first of the cases was filed.11 Litigants presumably 
respond to this design strategically. Plaintiffs’ lawyers, if given the 
opportunity, might choose to file their first case in front of the most plaintiff-
friendly judge, perhaps one elected from a heavily Democratic corner of the 
state. That judge could then vacuum up cases from across the state—even if 
the vast majority of the related lawsuits were filed in front of judges elected 
by very different constituencies. Thus, the Indiana version of this story 
implicates the horizontal distribution of power among locally elected judges, 
instead of the vertical distribution between state and local actors. Again, the 
consequences for litigants, voters, and intrastate relations are significant. 
In Texas, Indiana, and every other state with an MDL system, these 
consequential departures from the usual rules of venue and case assignment 
have played out with relatively little scrutiny or critical analysis because 
 
 7 See In re Farmers Ins. Co. Wind/Hail Storm Litig., 481 S.W.3d 422 (Tex. J.P.M.L. 2015). 
 8 TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 74.161 et seq. (West 2019); TEX. R. JUD. ADMIN. 13. 
 9 See infra Section II.B. 
 10 We have more to say about Texas MDL infra Section II.B and in D. Theodore Rave & Zachary 
D. Clopton, Texas MDL, 24 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 367 (2020) [hereinafter Rave & Clopton, Texas 
MDL]. 
 11 IND. R. TRIAL P. 42(D). 
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scholars have not been paying attention. This Article aims to change that by 
undertaking a comprehensive study of state MDL systems. Approximately 
half the states—including those with the largest legal markets—have some 
sort of MDL procedure that gives some judge or judges the power to 
consolidate and assign many of the state’s most important cases.12 We aim to 
unmask these processes and explore the consequences and tradeoffs they 
entail. 
Our descriptive contribution starts with a detailed survey of MDL 
practice in the states. We bring together state statutes and rules, interviews 
with judges and rulemakers, unpublished judicial records and committee 
deliberations, and our analysis of published and unpublished state judicial 
data. In Part I, we examine the variety of institutional-design choices that 
states have made and develop the first taxonomy of state MDL systems. 
More specifically, we divide states into four categories: those with (1) an 
“institutional” model in which some centralized institution other than a trial 
judge (such as a panel or the state supreme court) is empowered to 
consolidate cases, (2) a “peer” model in which trial judges with pending 
cases are empowered to consolidate cases from other peer judges around the 
state, (3) “ad hoc” approaches to certain mass litigations, and (4) no MDL 
procedures. Our institutional analysis turns on the central question of who 
decides whether and in front of which judge cases should be consolidated, 
though we also catalog in the main text and in the Appendices various other 
MDL issues on which states have made different choices. 
To gain a better understanding of how state MDLs work on the ground, 
in Part II we offer case studies of the MDL systems of two institutional states 
(California and Texas) and one peer state (Indiana) that vary on multiple 
dimensions. We examine the history and design of these states’ MDL 
systems, and we report new data on how frequently the procedures are used, 
in which types of cases, and on the diversity of judges selected. We also 
report in Part II previously unpublished data about the extent of 
consolidation in the other states with MDL procedures. We find that state 
MDLs handle a substantial number of cases of national importance in 
parallel—and often in cooperation—with federal MDLs, mostly related to 
products liability. But we also find that state MDLs more frequently handle 
cases of statewide importance, across a wide range of subject matters, for 
which federal jurisdiction is likely unavailable. In other words, while state 
MDLs offer opportunities for federal–state cooperation, they are more than 
mere adjuncts to the federal MDL system. 
 
 12 See infra Section I.A. 
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We draw on this descriptive work to develop an institutional analysis in 
Part III. First, we consider but ultimately reject the idea that state MDLs are 
a locus of interstate competition. The limits of state jurisdiction, and, perhaps 
more importantly, the goliath of federal MDL, mean that states are unlikely 
to use MDL procedures to compete with each other for judicial business. 
But this is not to say that political economy is irrelevant. Our second 
observation is that intrastate political economy—the competition between 
plaintiff- and defense-side interests—has implications for state MDL design 
choices. For example, the decision to empower trial judges versus external 
institutions to consolidate cases has significant consequences for the ability 
of parties to shop for their preferred forums and judges, which in turn shifts 
the balance of power between plaintiffs and defendants within the state. 
Empowering external institutions tends to blunt plaintiffs’ ability to forum 
shop to the benefit of defense-side interests, while empowering peer trial 
judges creates opportunities for plaintiffs to exert greater control over which 
courts and judges will hear their cases. 
Our third observation links this analysis to two other aspects of state 
judiciaries: how judges are selected (elected versus appointed) and what 
constituencies they represent (local versus statewide). Analyzing state MDLs 
in light of state judicial selection emphasizes the stakes for the allocation of 
judicial authority within the states, and sometimes for the will of the people 
expressed in judicial elections. For example, allowing a chief justice who 
was elected statewide to reassign cases from one locally elected trial judge 
(say in a conservative county) to another (say in a liberal county) has obvious 
consequences for the division of authority within the state and for the 
legitimacy of the judge’s ultimate decision. This is not to say that any 
particular combination of MDL procedure and judicial selection is right or 
wrong. Different states might reasonably make different choices about how 
to allocate judicial power and which values to prioritize in mass litigation. 
But it does mean that state MDL design interacts with fundamental questions 
of government power and democratic legitimacy. And it is not always clear 
that the designers of state MDL systems, who typically talk in terms of 
judicial administration, have fully thought through the implications of their 
design choices on these issues. 
Fourth, although we find no evidence that states adopted their MDL 
procedures in order to affect federal MDLs, the design of state MDLs has 
implications for complex disputes pending in both state and federal courts. 
A frequent objection to federal MDL is that it supposedly empowers a 
handful of plaintiffs’ lawyers who may not represent the interests of all 
plaintiffs. The presence of parallel state MDLs headed by different—but also 
powerful—plaintiffs’ lawyers may serve a checking function against the 
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federal lead counsel, just as states might do in a federal system. The potential 
for state MDLs to reduce agency costs through this form of federal–state 
competition comes at some cost to collective action, so we do not suggest 
that state MDLs are always positive additions to a nationwide dispute. But 
they have the capacity to substantially change litigation dynamics in ways 
that cannot be ignored. 
Fifth and finally, we return to issues of interstate relations to consider 
how state MDLs affect interjurisdictional cooperation. For one thing, the 
variation in state MDL procedures creates the opportunity for learning 
among policymakers and MDL judges—and, indeed, even since beginning 
this project, we have been contacted by multiple states seeking to use our 
results to help design their own state MDL systems.13 State MDLs also create 
opportunities for cooperation on actual cases. Particularly when nationwide 
disputes are chopped up into state and federal court components, we find that 
state MDLs offer potential forums for judicial cooperation. To take just one 
high-profile example, in the litigation surrounding the opioid crisis, there are 
nine state MDLs working in cooperation with the federal MDL proceeding.14 
Looking forward, we suggest that the presence of concurrent litigation 
should often cut in favor of state-level consolidation. 
In sum, this Article shows that the complex-litigation landscape 
consists of more than just federal MDL. State courts play an important role 
in resolving complex disputes. We find that states are adapting to that role 
by designing their own systems for coordination and management. And 
while this study does not permit us to identify the ideal state MDL system, it 
does demonstrate that state MDL choices have important consequences for 
litigants, courts, and voters. 
I. TAXONOMY AND INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 
To better understand the landscape of state MDLs, in this Part we 
survey the laws of all fifty states, creating the first taxonomy of state MDL 
systems. We then survey how MDL states handle important institutional-
design questions related to consolidation, assignment, and case management. 
Our results, which build on a practitioner treatise compiled more than a 
 
 13 We have received such inquiries from representatives of Florida and Ohio, two large states without 
MDL procedures. 
 14 See generally Zachary D. Clopton & D. Theodore Rave, Opioid Cases and State MDLs, DEPAUL 
L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 6–8) https://papers.ssrn.com/a=3680074 
[https://perma.cc/Z5EQ-S8RK] [hereinafter Clopton & Rave, Opioid Cases and State MDLs] (discussing 
cases in New York, Pennsylvania, West Virginia, Texas, South Carolina, Illinois, Massachusetts, 
Connecticut, and California). 
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decade ago,15 reveal wide variation among the states in the designs of their 
MDL systems. 
 Before diving in, though, there is an important scope question to be 
answered: What are state MDLs? Taking a cue from the federal statute, we 
are not focused on any particular case type (e.g., mass torts).16 Instead, we 
are looking for special mechanisms that depart from the ordinary venue or 
venue-transfer rules to allow for consolidation or coordination of cases 
across different courts within a single state. Provisions that allow for the 
transfer of cases to other proper venues (e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1404) or the 
consolidation of issues or cases pending within a single court (e.g., Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 42), therefore, would not qualify as “state MDLs.”17 
A. Taxonomy 
The first step in our project is to create a taxonomy of state MDLs. 
Although there are many ways to divide the universe, we settled on four 
broad categories: (1) states that rely on institutions outside of the trial courts 
to decide whether and where to consolidate cases (institutional MDL); 
(2) states that rely on trial judges with pending cases to decide whether to 
consolidate cases from other trial judges (peer MDL); (3) states that have a 
history of ad hoc consolidation (ad hoc MDL); and (4) states that do not 
appear to have any mechanism for MDL-like consolidation. As explained in 
Part III, these simple divisions have major consequences for how state MDLs 
affect important values. 
The results of our taxonomy are reproduced in Table 1 and displayed 
geographically in Figure 1.18 The balance of this Section will say a bit more 
 
 15 See generally HERRMANN ET AL., supra note 6 (surveying existing state MDL procedures). 
 16 See 28 U.S.C. § 1407; Clopton, MDL as Category, supra note 2, at 1316–17 (discussing federal 
MDL case types). For this reason, although interesting, we are not focused here on special state rules for 
complex or other subcategories of cases that might overlap with MDL but that do not involve the 
consolidation of cases across courts. See, e.g., ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 26.2 (dividing cases into tiers, with Tier 3 
being most complex); CAL. R. CT. 3.400–3.402; Special Sessions of the Superior Court, CONN. JUD. 
BRANCH, https://jud.ct.gov/external/super/spsess.htm#ComplexLitigationDocket [https://perma.cc/ 
CVT8-MUZR] (outlining Connecticut’s “Complex Litigation Docket”); FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.201 (outlining 
Florida’s “Complex Litigation” rule); 231 PA. CODE R. 1041.1 (detailing Pennsylvania’s special 
provisions for asbestos cases). Nor are we interested here in the fact that the Montana legislature, by 
statute, created a special asbestos claims court. MONT. CODE ANN. § 3-20-101 (2019). 
 17 We acknowledge that the label “MDL” may be technically inaccurate for states that do not divide 
their courts into “districts.” But because MDL comes with many connotations that help contextualize our 
analysis, we use the label despite its technical inaccuracy for some states. 
 18 The map was produced using “United States of America with States – Blue” by 
FreeVectorMaps.com. Map of the United States of America with States – Blue, FREE VECTOR MAPS, 
https://freevectormaps.com/united-states/US-EPS-02-4002?ref=search_result [https://perma.cc/VE67-
5GMW]. 
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about each of our categories and how we resolved close cases. Additional 
information and citations to relevant sources are included in Appendix A. 
TABLE 1: STATE MDL TAXONOMY 
Institutional 
MDL 
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FIGURE 1: STATE MDL TAXONOMY 
 
1. Institutional MDL 
Our first category comprises those states with institutional MDL 
procedures. What distinguishes these states is that they rely on some 
institution independent of trial judges to decide whether to consolidate or 
coordinate cases pending in different courts and to decide which trial judge 
should handle those cases. Institutional MDL systems may rely on a 
dedicated panel for multidistrict litigation, the state’s highest court, or the 
state’s chief justice to make the consolidation decision. 
Thirteen states have adopted institutional MDL procedures: California, 
Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois, Kansas, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, 
North Carolina, Oregon, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia.19 We describe 
in more detail the particulars of these states’ procedures below.20 
Including Connecticut in this category was a close call because it has a 
hybrid MDL procedure. Connecticut law permits related cases to be 
transferred by the trial judges, by party consent, or by the chief court 
administrator (appointed by the chief justice).21 The ability of a trial judge 
with pending cases to transfer them for consolidated proceedings would 
 
 19 See infra Table A1. Oregon’s MDL procedure, however, is limited to class actions pending in 
different courts. OR. R. CIV. P. 32(K). 
 20 See infra Section I.B. 
 21 See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 51-347b (2019). 
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place Connecticut in the peer category. But we have chosen to include 
Connecticut in the institutional category because of the option to rely on 
another judicial actor—here the chief court administrator—to transfer cases 
without a trial judge’s approval. 
2. Peer MDL 
Our second category comprises states that authorize state trial judges as 
trial judges—not as panel members, as in the federal and some state 
systems—to consolidate cases across judicial districts. Seven states fit this 
description: Indiana, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, 
Rhode Island, and Wisconsin.22 
Peer MDL models also vary. In some states, the judge in the earliest 
filed action can order cases filed around the state to be transferred and 
consolidated in that court. In other states, any judge with a pending case can 
decide on consolidation and transfer. Still other states require the 
concurrence of both the transferor and transferee judges to effect a 
consolidation. We describe these different models below,23 but they all share 
the salient feature of assigning consolidation responsibility to trial judges 
with pending cases. 
3. Ad Hoc MDL 
Our third category comprises four states that have engaged in ad hoc 
MDL-like procedures: Michigan, Oklahoma, South Carolina, and 
Tennessee.24 
In Michigan, the supreme court ordered consolidation of mass litigation 
on at least two occasions: breast-implant cases in 1993 and antitrust cases 
against Microsoft in 2000.25 Both times, the Michigan Supreme Court issued 
detailed orders that specified many aspects of the consolidated proceedings, 
 
 22 See infra Table A1. A close call here is Maryland. Maryland has a special rule that allows trial 
judges to transfer cases with common questions of law or fact across judicial circuits, but ultimately we 
do not think it belongs in the peer MDL category. MD. R. CIV. P. 2-327(d). The reason is that the rule 
specifies that the transferor judge may transfer a case only to a court in which the case could have been 
brought. In other words, it works like a typical venue transfer, and the normal rules of venue apply. 
(Technically, the rule requires that circuit administrative judges approve the transfer as well, but, unlike 
Connecticut, that does not displace the role of the transferor judge.) 
 23 See infra Section I.B.2. 
 24 See infra Table A1. 
 25 See In re Microsoft Antitrust Litig., Admin. Order No. 2000-5 (Mich. 2000) & In re Silicone Gel 
Implant Prod. Liab. Litig., Admin. Order No. 1993-2 (Mich. 1993), 
https://courts.michigan.gov/Courts/MichiganSupremeCourt/rules/Documents/Administrative%20Orders
.pdf [https://perma.cc/A8WK-8F7V]. 
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but without any MDL-specific rule or statute.26 The Michigan Supreme Court 
considered, but ultimately rejected, similar consolidation of asbestos cases.27 
In Oklahoma, the supreme court ordered the consolidation of state 
breast-implant litigation in 1993, relying on its “general supervisory and 
administrative powers” under the Oklahoma constitution.28 Since then, the 
court has relied on these powers to consolidate other cases on an ad hoc basis, 
but there is no rule or statute governing its decisions.29 
The Supreme Court of South Carolina also consolidated state breast-
implant litigation for pretrial proceedings only.30 
The fourth state in this category is Tennessee. Unlike the previous three, 
what makes Tennessee ad hoc is that it has a consolidation procedure only 
in the local rules of one of its districts. The Local Rules of Practice for Shelby 
County provide that, upon motion, all of the judges of the court can sit 
together to decide whether consolidation is appropriate.31 Such consolidation 
is permitted even for cases in multiple divisions within the district. We 
include Tennessee among the ad hoc states because this local rule shows that 
statewide authorities have essentially left MDL up to the local courts—a 
different sense of ad hoc. 
 
 26 See id. Interestingly, the procedures for these two ad hoc consolidations differed in significant 
ways. For example, the breast-implant cases were consolidated for pretrial purposes only, while the 
Microsoft cases were consolidated for all purposes, including trial. Id. 
 27 Prohibition on “Bundling” Cases, Admin. Order No. 2006-6 (Mich. 2006), https://www.icle.org/ 
contentfiles/milawnews/Rules/Ao/2003-47_08-09-06_unformatted-order.html [https://perma.cc/BRZ2-
9J3R]. The court explained:  
[T]he Court has determined that trial courts should be precluded from “bundling” asbestos-related 
cases for settlement or trial. It is the opinion of the Court that each case should be decided on its 
own merits, and not in conjunction with other cases. Thus, no asbestos-related disease personal 
injury action shall be joined with any other such case for settlement or for any other purpose, with 
the exception of discovery. 
Id. In considering consolidation, the court drafted a proposed order that built on elements of the two prior 
consolidations. See Proposed Admin. Order Regarding Asbestos-Related Disease Litig., ADM File No. 
2003-47 (Mich. 2006), https://www.icle.org/contentfiles/milawnews/Rules/Ao/2003-47_02-23-
06_unformatted-order.html [https://perma.cc/DX8Y-KN6Y]. 
 28 In re Okla. Breast Implant Cases, 847 P.2d 772, 772–73 (1993). 
 29 See HERRMANN ET AL., supra note 6, at 447 (explaining this dynamic and citing examples of cases 
consolidated under this constitutionally derived authority). 
 30 See In re Breast Implant Prod. Liab. Litig., 503 S.E.2d 445, 446 (S.C. 1998); see also HERRMANN 
ET AL., supra note 6, at 515 (noting this example). We are not aware of other consolidation orders of this 
kind in South Carolina. 
 31  SHELBY CNTY., TENN., THIRTIETH JUD. DIST. AT MEMPHIS, LOCAL RULES OF PRACTICE r. 28 
(2012), https://www.shelbycountytn.gov/DocumentCenter/View/413/rules_of_the_court?bidId= [https:// 
perma.cc/6E98-5AC8]. 
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Note that, although we feel relatively comfortable with our list of 
institutional and peer states (having scoured state statutes and court rules) 
and the four states we have identified here, we are less sure that we have 
identified all the states that have, at some point, engaged in ad hoc 
consolidation. Such is the nature of ad hockery.32 
4. No MDL Analogy 
Twenty-six states appear to have no special MDL-like procedures.33 
Ordinary venue transfers are, of course, possible in these states. These states 
also typically allow the consolidation of different cases pending in a single 
court, and some even have special procedures for handling certain types of 
cases (e.g., asbestos litigation).34 But we have found no statutory or rules-
based mechanisms for consolidating or coordinating cases across venues in 
these states. 
5. The Road Not Taken 
Finally, we would be remiss for not mentioning here that at least two 
states considered adopting MDL procedures but declined. 
In 2007, the chief justice of the Kentucky Supreme Court established 
what came to be called the Mass Tort and Class Action Litigation 
Committee.35 In its 2010 Final Report, the Committee explained that it had 
considered but declined to pursue a special MDL-like procedure for complex 
cases. The Committee wrote: “While Kentucky has many jurisdictions, the 
relative infrequency of cases spanning multiple circuits renders multi-district 
litigation rules unnecessary.”36 
Around the same time, Ohio began to consider an MDL rule at the 
behest of Mark Herrmann,37 author of the leading practitioner treatise on state 
MDLs. Herrmann’s 2007 suggestion led to a 2014 memorandum prepared 
 
 32 See generally Pamela K. Bookman & David L. Noll, Ad Hoc Procedure, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 767, 
767 (2017) (describing the general practice of ad hoc procedure making). 
 33 The states are: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, 
Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, 
North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, Washington, and Wyoming. See infra Table A1. 
 34 See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 3-20-102, 3-20-103 (2019) (creating special asbestos claim court); 
ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 26.2 (dividing cases into tiers, with Tier 3 being most complex). 
 35 See KY. SUP. CT., MASS TORT AND CLASS ACTION LITIGATION COMMITTEE: FINAL REPORT 3 
(2010), https://courts.ky.gov/resources/publicationsresources/Publications/MassTortandClassAction 
LitigationCommitteeFinalReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/8YPK-ZMXA]. 
 36 Id. at 4.  
 37 See SUP. CT. OF OHIO, MEMORANDUM RE: RECOMMENDATION FOR A MULTI-DISTRICT 
LITIGATION PROGRAM (2014); SUP. CT. OF OHIO, ADVISORY COMM. ON CASE MGMT., MEETING 
MINUTES (2014); SUP CT. OF OHIO, MEMORANDUM RE: ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CASE MANAGEMENT 
2014 ANNUAL REPORT (2015). 
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for the state’s Advisory Committee on Case Management. A subcommittee 
recommended the creation of an MDL rule, but the full committee ultimately 
did not adopt that recommendation.38 While there remains some interest for 
pursuing this sort of rule reform in Ohio, the issue is not presently on the 
Committee’s agenda. 
B. Institutional Design of State MDL Systems 
The previous Section created a taxonomy of states based on the 
structure of their MDL systems. But our general labels do not tell the entire 
story. The choice between vesting the consolidation decision in a centralized 
institution versus in a trial judge has important consequences for how these 
systems interact with party choice and judicial power. Within the 
institutional and peer MDL categories, we find significant differences in the 
ways that these states allocate institutional or peer control. We describe those 
differences here and summarize them in Table 2 at the end of this Section.39 
These choices connect not only with MDL design but also with questions of 
judicial selection. We, therefore, also report in this Section (and discuss in 
detail in Part III) the methods of selecting judges in the states.40 
1. Institutional States 
Within our institutional MDL category, different states authorize 
different institutions to decide whether and where to transfer and consolidate 
cases. The three primary approaches are (1) a dedicated MDL panel, (2) the 
 
 38 See supra note 37. 
 39 In addition to citations to particular provisions, we provide citations to all of the relevant statutes 
and rules in Table A1 infra. 
 40 There is, of course, far more to say about judicial selection (and its connection to case outcomes) 
than we can say here. For just a few examples addressing these issues, see HERBERT M. KRITZER, 
JUSTICES ON THE BALLOT: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN STATE SUPREME COURT ELECTIONS (2015) 
(reporting on the historical patterns of state supreme court elections and analyzing the reasons behind the 
changes in the methods); Herbert M. Kritzer, Judicial Elections in the 2010s, 67 DEPAUL L. REV. 387 
(2018) (updating the analysis in Justices on the Ballot with data from 2013 through 2016 elections); Adam 
Bonica & Maya Sen, The Politics of Selecting the Bench from the Bar: The Legal Profession and Partisan 
Incentives to Introduce Ideology into Judicial Selection, 60 J.L. & ECON. 559 (2017) (exploring how 
ideology influences the selection of judges); Brian T. Fitzpatrick, The Ideological Consequences of 
Selection: A Nationwide Study of the Methods of Selecting Judges, 70 VAND. L. REV. 1729, 1732 (2017) 
(assessing whether “certain methods of selection have resulted in judiciaries that skew to the left or right 
compared with the public at large in those states”); Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, Politics, 
Identity, and Class Certification on the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 119 MICH. L. REV. 231, 233 (2020) 
(exploring “the relationship between the ideology, gender, and race of U.S. Court of Appeals judges and 
decisions addressing class certification”).  
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state’s highest court, and (3) the state’s chief justice. Here we catalog some 
additional variations in how these institutions are composed and selected.41 
a. Dedicated panel 
One of the most distinctive features of the federal MDL statute is its 
reliance on a panel of judges to consolidate, transfer, and assign MDLs.42 For 
that reason, we start our inquiry with states that use panels. 
Five states rely on a specialized MDL panel to consolidate cases: 
Colorado, New York, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia.43 Three of these 
states, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia, also authorize the panel to assign 
consolidated cases to specific judges, as in the federal system.44 In New York, 
the panel decides where to send consolidated cases, but the administrative 
judge of the selected transferee court assigns the cases to a particular judge.45 
In Colorado, the panel has the power to make recommendations to the chief 
justice, who makes the ultimate decision on which judge will hear the 
consolidated cases.46 
Panel design in these states varies on multiple dimensions. One such 
dimension is panel selection. In the federal system, the Chief Justice alone 
selects panel members.47 Because all federal judges are appointed, and 
because an appointed Chief Justice selects the panel members, the federal 
Panel has a double layer of insulation from electoral politics. But state 
models of judicial selection vary considerably. No state MDL panels are 
directly elected, providing at least one layer of insulation, but some panels 
are chosen by, and composed of, elected judges. 
 
 41 Here, as elsewhere, we rely on the formal allocation of decisional authority. It is possible, for 
example, that when a state authorizes the supreme court to decide on consolidation, in practice the chief 
justice makes the decision. But for our purposes, such a state would be described as one in which the 
supreme court decides. 
 42 See 28 U.S.C. § 1407. 
 43 See infra Table A1. 
44 See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(b) (“[C]oordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings shall be conducted 
by a judge or judges to whom such actions are assigned by the judicial panel on multidistrict litigation.”); 
infra notes 198–211 and accompanying text (discussing Texas’s MDL procedure, including the MDL 
panel’s assignment powers); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-267.4 (2020) (providing that Virginia’s MDL panel 
“may order some or all of the actions transferred to a circuit court in which one or more of the actions are 
pending for purposes of coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings”); W. VA. TRIAL CT. R. 26.05(c) 
(permitting the MDL panel to “request the assignment by the Chief Justice of additional active or senior 
status circuit court judges to assist the Panel in resolving Mass Litigation or proceedings therein as 
needed”). 
45 See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 202.69(b)(2), (c)(1) (2020). 
 46 See COLO. R. CIV. P. 42.1(a)(1), (h); Beckord v. Dist. Ct., 698 P.2d 1323, 1327 (Colo. 1985). 
 47 See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(d). 
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Colorado and Texas rely on their chief justices alone to select panel 
members.48 The Colorado chief justice is appointed and subject to retention 
elections; the Texas chief justice is elected in partisan elections.49 In West 
Virginia, the chief justice selects the panel, subject to approval by the 
supreme court.50 All justices of the West Virginia supreme court are elected 
in nonpartisan elections. In New York, the panel is selected by the chief 
administrator of the courts for the state,51 who is an administrative officer 
appointed by the chief judge of New York’s highest court with advice and 
consent of an administrative board.52 The New York chief judge is, in turn, 
appointed by the governor.53 Finally, in Virginia, the supreme court selects 
panel members. Virginia supreme court justices are selected by the state 
legislature.54 Interestingly, the Virginia supreme court appoints a new panel 
for every consolidation decision.55 Thus, New York, Colorado, and Virginia 
emulate the federal courts’ model of double insulation, while Texas and West 
Virginia are not as far removed from electoral politics. 
A second way in which states vary is in panel membership. In the 
federal system, the panel is comprised of seven judges from district and 
circuit courts, no two of whom may be from the same circuit.56 At the state 
level, there is substantial variation in the size of the panel, the types of judges 
eligible to serve, and whether geographic diversity is required. More 
specifically, according to the rules or statutes in these panel states: 
 
 48 COLO. R. CIV. P. 42.1(a)(1); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 74.161(a) (West 2019). 
 49 Information on judicial selection in the states is maintained by the National Center for State Courts. 
Judicial Selection in the States, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS., http://www.judicialselection.us 
[https://perma.cc/2RT5-KJNC]. There are three basic models of judicial elections: (1) partisan elections, 
in which candidates run as nominees of a political party; (2) nonpartisan elections, in which candidates’ 
political affiliation does not appear on the ballot; and (3) retention elections, in which judges who were 
initially appointed face no opponent but must garner a certain percentage of the votes to retain their 
offices. See Brandice Canes-Wrone, Tom S. Clark & Jee-Kwang Park, Judicial Independence and 
Retention Elections, 28 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 211, 211–12 (2010). 
 50 W. VA. TRIAL CT. R. 26.02. 
 51 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 202.69(b)(1) (2020). 
52 N.Y. JUD. LAW § 210(3) (McKinney 2020). 
53 NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS., supra note 49. 
 54 VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-267.4 (2020). 
55 See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-267.4(A) (2020) (stating that, when appropriate, “any party may apply 
to a panel of circuit court judges designated by the Supreme Court for an order of transfer”). 
 56 28 U.S.C. § 1407(d). Today, the panel is made up of seven district judges. Historically, about 85% 
of panel judges have been district judges. See Roster of Current and Former Judges of the United States 
Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, U.S. JUD. PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIG., 
https://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/sites/jpml/files/Panel%20Judges%20Roster-10-16-2018_0.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/8F62-46QR]. 
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 Colorado’s panel includes “not less than three nor more than 
seven district judges . . . no two of whom shall be from the 
same judicial district.”57 
 New York’s panel must include one justice from the supreme 
court of each judicial department.58 (New York’s supreme court 
is its trial court of general jurisdiction.)59 
 Texas’s panel is made up of active appellate judges or 
administrative judges.60 
 Virginia’s panels are made up of trial judges selected for each 
consolidation decision.61 
 West Virginia’s panel is made up of seven active or senior trial 
judges, appointed to three-year terms on a rotating basis with a 
new chair every year.62 
b. Highest court 
In Illinois, Kansas, New Jersey, and Oregon, the state’s highest court 
makes the decision whether to consolidate and transfer related cases.63 In 
Kansas, Illinois, and New Jersey, the high court also chooses the transferee 
judge. In Oregon, the chief justice alone chooses the transferee judge.64 
Illinois and Oregon elect their supreme court justices. In Kansas and New 
Jersey, they are appointed.65 
c. Chief justice 
In California, Minnesota, and North Carolina, the chief justice of the 
state’s highest court decides whether and where to consolidate cases.66 In 
Minnesota and North Carolina, the chief justice alone makes the 
consolidation and choice-of-transferee decisions.67 The chief justice is 
elected in nonpartisan elections in Minnesota and partisan elections in North 
Carolina. In California, the gubernatorially appointed chief justice has 
 
 57 COLO. R. CIV. P. 42.1(a)(1). 
 58  N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 202.69(b)(1) (2020). 
59 History, N.Y. STATE UNIFIED CT. SYS., http://ww2.nycourts.gov/courts/1jd/supctmanh/ 
A_Brief_history_of_the_Court.shtml [https://perma.cc/LS2S-PRCV]. 
 60 TEX. GOV’T CODE § 74.161(a) (West 2019). 
 61 VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-267.4 (2020). 
 62 W. VA. TRIAL CT. R. 26.02. 
 63 ILL. SUP. CT. R. 384(a); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-242(c)(1) (2014); N.J. CT. R. 4:38A; OR. R. CIV. 
P. 32K. 
64 Or. R. Civ. P. 32K(2). 
65 Information on judicial selection in the states is maintained by the National Center for State Courts. 
NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS., supra note 49. 
 66 See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 404 (West 2021); COLO. R. CIV. P. 42.1(a)(1); MINN. GEN. R. PRAC. 
113.03(a); N.C. GEN. R. PRAC. SUPER. & DIST. CTS. 2.1(a)–(b).  
 67 MINN. GEN. R. PRAC. 113.03(a); N.C. GEN. R. PRAC. SUPER. & DIST. CTS. 2.1(a)–(b). 
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ultimate authority on consolidation and transfer, but California has an 
elaborate system by which other judges provide advice on the consolidation 
decision and selection of the transferee judge. This system is discussed in 
greater detail in Section II.A.  
d. Hybrid  
Finally, Connecticut has adopted a hybrid system. Connecticut assigns 
transfer authority to the chief court administrator along with the trial judges 
and the parties.68 The state’s chief justice has the authority to select the judge 
who will serve as the chief court administrator.69 Judges and justices in 
Connecticut are appointed by the governor.70 
2. Peer States 
Peer MDL states vest the authority to consolidate cases in the hands of 
trial court judges with pending cases. But there is variation in which trial 
court judge gets to make that decision and in how those judges are put on the 
bench. 
a. First-filed judge  
In Indiana, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania, the judge in the earliest 
filed action can order other cases filed around the state to be transferred to 
that judge’s court.71 Massachusetts and Pennsylvania also give the judge in 
the first-filed case the discretion to transfer all of the cases to a court where 
later filed cases are pending,72 though in Massachusetts there is a 
presumption that the cases will be consolidated in the court with the first-
filed case.73 Trial judges in Indiana and Pennsylvania are elected in local 
partisan elections, and in Massachusetts are appointed by the governor.74 
b. Any judge  
In New Hampshire, any judge receiving a motion to consolidate can 
decide on consolidation and transfer.75 Similarly, in Maine and Rhode Island, 
the rules provide that any judge with a pending case can order a joint hearing 
 
 68 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 51-347b (2019). 
69  Id. 
70  NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS., supra note 49. 
 71 IND. R. TRIAL P. 42(D); MASS. SUPER. CT. R. 31; PA. R. CIV. P. 213.1. 
72  See MASS. SUPER. CT. R. 31; PA. R. CIV. P. 213.1(c). 
73  See MASS. SUPER. CT. R. 31. 
74  NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS., supra note 49. 
 75 N.H. SUPER. CT. R. 12(b). 
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or trial.76 Trial judges are appointed by the governor in Maine, New 
Hampshire, and Rhode Island.77 
c. Joint decision  
Finally, in Wisconsin, the transferee and transferor judges must issue a 
joint order for consolidation.78 Trial judges in Wisconsin are elected in local 
nonpartisan elections.79 
3. Summary 
Table 2 summarizes the institutional design adopted by states with 
institutional and peer MDL systems. It also includes information on the four 
ad hoc states described above. 
TABLE 2: STATE MDL INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 
Model Decider State 
Institutional 
Panel 
Colorado, New York, Texas, Virginia (new 
each time), West Virginia 
Supreme court Kansas, Illinois, New Jersey, Oregon 
Chief justice 
Minnesota (chief alone), North Carolina 
(chief alone), California (advice from 
coordination motion judge) 
Hybrid 
Connecticut (chief court administrator or 
trial judge) 
Peer 
First-filed judge Indiana, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania 
Any judge Maine, New Hampshire, Rhode Island 
Joint decision Wisconsin 
Ad Hoc 
Supreme court 
Michigan (breast implants and Microsoft 
antitrust), Oklahoma (breast implants and 
others), South Carolina (breast implants) 
District judges en 
banc 
Tennessee (one county by local rule) 
 
 76 This power goes beyond the usual consolidation rule exemplified by Federal Rule 42 because the 
rules in Maine and Rhode Island expressly provide for consolidation across different counties. See ME. 
R. CIV. P. 42; R.I. SUPER. CT. R. CIV. P. 42(a). Kansas and Massachusetts have this rule as well, but they 
also have other consolidation mechanisms described in the text. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-242(a) (2014); 
MASS. R. CIV. P. 42(a). 
 77 Information on judicial selection in the states is maintained by the National Center for State Courts. 
NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS., http://www.judicialselection.us [https://perma.cc/HY75-YLGX]. 
 78 WIS. STAT. § 805.05(1)(b) (2020). 
 79 Information on judicial selection in the states is maintained by the National Center for State Courts. 
NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS., http://www.judicialselection.us [https://perma.cc/HY75-YLGX]. 
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C. Consolidation Rules 
Institutional design is not the only way that state MDLs can vary. For 
example, regardless of which entity or individual has the power to 
consolidate, states have to make choices about the standard for consolidation 
to be applied and the extent of that consolidation.80 
1. Standards for Consolidation 
The standard for consolidation is important because it regulates which 
cases are candidates for the special venue and assignment rules that define 
MDL.81 The standard for consolidation in a federal MDL is broad. The 
federal MDL statute requires only that cases share “one or more common 
questions of fact” and that the JPML determines that transfer “will be for the 
convenience of parties and witnesses and will promote the just and efficient 
conduct of such actions.”82 
Some states, like Illinois and Texas, track the federal standard quite 
closely, while others diverge in both directions. Some states focus only on 
the relatedness of the cases,83 while others apply a stricter transactional test84 
or (echoing class action law) ask whether common questions predominate 
over individual ones.85 Some states spell out specialized standards, while 
others are quite vague. New York and New Jersey include the presence of 
consolidated proceedings elsewhere as a factor weighing in favor of 
consolidation in those states’ courts. New Jersey and West Virginia limit 
consolidation to certain subject matters; Oregon limits consolidation to class 
actions; and Virginia specifies a minimum number of plaintiffs. We provide 
citations and the relevant language for all of these standards in Table A2. But 
one thing they all have in common is that their broad language vests 
substantial discretion in the official or institution authorized to decide when 
consolidation is appropriate. 
 
 80 As above, for readability, we rely primarily on Tables A1 and A2 in Appendix A for the citations 
to these statutes and rules.  
 81 Cf. Clopton, MDL as Category, supra note 2, at 1311–14, 1325–41 (discussing the significance of 
being in or out of an MDL). 
 82 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a). 
 83 See infra Table A2. Indiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, and Rhode Island require only a 
common question of law or fact. Maryland does as well, but we do not consider Maryland to have a true 
MDL procedure.  
 84  See infra Table A2. Kansas and Wisconsin require the cases to arise out of the same transaction 
or occurrence. New Hampshire allows consolidation if the cases either arise out of the same transaction 
or event or share common issues of law or fact.  
 85 See infra Table A2. California, Colorado, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Virginia consider, among 
other factors, whether common questions predominate.  
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2. Extent of Consolidation 
A related issue for any MDL system is the extent to which cases are 
consolidated. The federal system is notable because it permits consolidations 
for pretrial proceedings only.86 Cases must be remanded to the districts 
where they were originally filed for trial. In practice, however, this rule is 
not as limiting as it appears; less than 3% of cases are ever actually remanded 
out of an MDL as of 2013, usually because they are resolved in the MDL 
court by settlement or dispositive motion.87 This formally limited nature of 
the transfer, though, has been key to making federal MDL work, allowing it 
to avoid many of the due process, personal jurisdiction, and choice of law 
challenges that largely prevent the use of class actions in mass tort cases.88 
Limited transfer does not appear to be an essential feature of state MDL 
systems. Only three states—Kansas, New York, and Texas—formally limit 
consolidation to pretrial only.89 
The rest of the states with institutional and peer MDL systems appear 
to allow consolidation for all purposes including trial (though they may 
permit or require remand in certain circumstances). The MDL rules or 
statutes expressly permit consolidation for trial in California, Connecticut, 
Illinois, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jersey, 
North Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Virginia, West 
Virginia, and Wisconsin.90 Indiana’s statute presumptively limits 
consolidations to pretrial only, but it permits transferee judges to oversee 
trials if “the court finds that the action involves unusual or complicated issues 
of fact or law or involves a substantial question of law of great public 
importance.”91 
 
 86 Although reformers have often sought to allow federal MDL judges to try transferred cases, in 
1998 the U.S. Supreme Court made the temporary nature of the transfer clear in Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg 
Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 34–40 (1998).  
 87 See Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Remanding Multidistrict Litigation, 75 LA. L. REV. 399, 400–01 
(2014). 
 88 See Andrew D. Bradt & D. Theodore Rave, Aggregation on Defendants’ Terms: Bristol-Myers 
Squibb and the Federalization of Mass-Tort Litigation, 59 B.C. L. REV. 1251, 1296–99 (2018) 
[hereinafter Bradt & Rave, Aggregation on Defendants’ Terms] (describing federal MDL’s “split 
personality” and its implications); Bradt & Rave, The Information-Forcing Role, supra note 3, at 1269–
73 (same); Bradt & Rave, It’s Good to Have the “Haves,” supra note 3, at 103–04 (same). 
 89 Technically, Kansas and New York expressly permit consolidation for trial with consent, but we 
are discussing here the extent to which the MDL systems consolidate cases.  
 90 See infra Table A2. Had we included Maryland as a peer state, it would appear on this list as well. 
See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
 91 IND. R. TRIAL P. 42(d). See infra Section II.C.2. 
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In sum, in most states, MDL consolidation is for all purposes.92 And 
even in the three states for which MDL is limited to pretrial proceedings, the 
federal experience suggests that most cases will be resolved in the MDL 
court. In other words, it is likely the case that MDL judges in all states have 
substantial authority to guide most consolidated cases to final resolution. 
D. Management 
State MDL rules also vary on many issues of MDL management. We 
address a selection of these issues here, focusing on those that have been of 
interest to MDL scholars and reformers. Indeed, for scholarship on federal 
MDL, these issues of MDL management have been of primary concern.93 As 
the following descriptions make clear, MDL rules often do not specify 
exactly how MDLs should be handled, and even when they do, they vest 
substantial discretion in MDL judges. 
1. Transferee Court 
A central choice in the MDL process is the selection of the transferee 
court. The federal statute does not include any limits on the choice of 
transferee district. And the JPML has generally felt free to create an MDL in 
whatever district it sees fit—even districts where no cases are pending.94 
Some state rules, however, are more restrictive. In at least Kansas, 
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, and Virginia, the transferee 
court must be a court in which at least one of the consolidated actions is 
 
 92 We do not have a good theory for why so many states eschew the federal model and allow transfer 
for trial purposes. Nor do we have a good theory for why Kansas, New York, and Texas in particular 
chose to limit consolidation to pretrial only. One possibility (which we cannot prove) is that both New 
York and Texas adopted their institutional MDL procedures after the U.S. Supreme Court made it clear 
in Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 40 (1998), that remand was 
mandatory in the federal system. (The Kansas MDL rule was adopted before Lexecon, but it appears to 
have been rarely used. See HERRMANN ET AL., supra note 6, at 283–85.) Many of the states that allow 
consolidation for trial purposes adopted their MDL procedures before this decision, when the federal 
JPML took the position that MDL transferee judges were permitted to transfer consolidated cases to 
themselves for trial. Massachusetts (2015), Minnesota (2000), and New Jersey (2003) are exceptions. See 
infra Table A1. Another potential explanation stems from the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA). 
According to recent decisions, consolidation for trial purposes on plaintiffs’ request may result in these 
cases becoming removable as “mass actions” under CAFA. See, e.g., Atwell v. Bos. Sci. Corp., 740 F.3d 
1160, 1161–62 (8th Cir. 2013). But the availability of CAFA removal does not appear to be a driver in 
state MDL design, as most of the MDL systems were adopted before 2005, when CAFA was enacted. 
93 See Clopton, MDL as Category, supra note 2, at 1305–11 (collecting sources discussing potential 
changes to MDL case management). 
 94 See, e.g., In re Wright Med. Tech., Inc., Conserve Hip Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., 844 F. Supp. 
2d 1371, 1373–74 (J.P.M.L. 2012) (consolidating cases in the Northern District of Georgia even though 
none of the actions pending at the time of the consolidation were pending in that district). 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
1672 
pending.95 Massachusetts starts with a presumption that cases should be 
consolidated in the court where the earliest filed action is pending.96 Indiana 
appears to allow consolidation only in the first-filed court.97 And Colorado 
places special limits on consolidation for jury cases.98 California and New 
Jersey do not limit the transferee court, but their rules specify factors that 
could affect the choice of transferee court.99 
2. Tag-Along Cases 
Often, after a consolidated proceeding is established, additional cases 
are filed or identified that seemingly fit in the consolidated proceeding. In 
the federal system, the clerk of the JPML can conditionally transfer so-called 
“tag-along” actions; if a party objects, the JPML itself has the option to 
vacate the order.100 
The states take many different approaches to these sorts of tag-along 
cases.101 The transferee judge, upon a motion, can consolidate tag-alongs in 
California, Oregon, Virginia, and (with advice and consent of the panel) 
West Virginia. In Colorado, the court clerk can effect the transfer. In New 
York, unopposed tag-along motions are granted automatically, while 
opposed motions go to the panel. In New Jersey, the supreme court’s initial 
order can specify when tag-alongs may be transferred automatically. And in 
Texas, tag-alongs are transferred upon a notice of filing, but then any party 
can ask the transferee court to remand the action. That decision is appealable 
to the panel. 
 
 95 See infra Table A1.  
 96 MASS. SUPER. CT. R. 31. 
 97 IND. R. TRIAL P. 42(d). 
 98 COLO. R. CIV. P. 42.1(b)(1) (only allowing jury trials in consolidated cases in venues proper under 
Colorado Rule 98).  
 99 In California, the chief justice selects the transferee court upon a recommendation of the 
coordination motion judge. That judge is asked to consider:  
(1) The number of included actions in particular locations; (2) Whether the litigation is at an 
advanced stage in a particular court; (3) The efficient use of court facilities and judicial resources; 
(4) The locations of witnesses and evidence; (5) The convenience of the parties and witnesses; 
(6) The parties’ principal places of business; (7) The office locations of counsel for the parties; 
and (8) The ease of travel to and availability of accommodations in particular locations. 
CAL. R. CT. 3.530. In New Jersey, the supreme court is to consider “[i]ssues of fairness, geographical 
location of parties and attorneys, and the existing civil and multicounty litigation caseload in the 
vicinage.” N.J. CTS., ADMIN. OFF. OF THE CTS., MULTICOUNTY LITIGATION GUIDELINES DIRECTIVE 
# 08-12 (2012).  
 100 R. PROC. J.P.M.L. 7.1. 
 101 For all relevant provisions, see infra Table A1.  
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3. Lead or Liaison Counsel 
In federal MDL, the appointment of lead or liaison counsel is a 
contentious issue.102 The federal statute does not expressly authorize the 
transferee judge to appoint lawyers, but the practice is well established and 
recommended by the Manual for Complex Litigation. 
At least five states (California, New York, Texas, Virginia, and West 
Virginia) specify the authority to select lead or liaison counsel in their 
consolidation rules, though these states’ rules say little about the criteria for 
selection.103 New Jersey also advises but does not require the appointment of 
liaison counsel.104 Other states are largely silent, though none denies the 
MDL judge the authority to appoint lawyers. 
4. Remand 
Another issue arising in federal MDL that has received considerable 
attention is remand.105 In the federal system, the JPML is empowered to 
remand cases to transferor courts, though the panel’s near-universal practice 
is not to remand unless and until the transferee judge suggests it.106 
There is variation in the states regarding which institution decides when 
remand is appropriate. In at least California, Kansas, Minnesota, New Jersey, 
New York, Oregon, Texas, and Virginia, the transferee judge has the power 
to remand without any action on the part of the panel, high court, or other 
institution.107 In Illinois, the supreme court can separate and remand any 
claim at any time.108 In West Virginia, the panel has special authority to 
 
 102 See generally, e.g., Bradt & Rave, It’s Good to Have the “Haves,” supra note 3 (arguing that 
repeat-player attorneys appointed to MDL leadership positions add value for plaintiffs); Burch, 
Monopolies, supra note 3 (arguing that MDL leadership-appointment practices favor repeat-player 
attorneys who may feel more loyalty to each other than to their clients); Burch & Williams, supra note 3 
(demonstrating extent to which repeat players are appointed to MDL leadership positions); Silver & 
Miller, supra note 3 (arguing that MDL lead lawyers may feel more loyal to judges than clients because 
judges have so much control over attorney compensation).  
 103 See infra Table A1 for relevant statutes.  
 104 See N.J. CTS., NEW JERSEY MULTICOUNTY LITIGATION (NON-ASBESTOS) RESOURCE BOOK 12 
(4th ed. 2014), https://www.njcourts.gov/attorneys/assets/mcl/nonasbestosmanual.pdf?c=7ir 
[https://perma.cc/PJ4U-MMSL]. Though not addressing lead or liaison counsel per se, we also note that 
Massachusetts’s rules require the transferee judge to hold an early conference among the parties “to 
establish a Tracking Order for the consolidated cases and to address other matters raised by the 
consolidation.” MASS. SUPER. CT. R. 31. This presumably may include counsel appointments. 
 105 See generally, e.g., Symposium, The Rest of the Story: Resolving the Cases Remanded by the 
MDL, 75 LA. L. REV. 341 (2014) (featuring articles and comments that focus on remand in MDL). 
 106 See Burch, supra note 87, at 402. 
 107 See infra Table A1. In Kansas, the transferee judge must notify the supreme court when it remands 
cases, but no action appears to be required of the supreme court. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-242(c)(3) (2014). 
108 Ill. Sup. Ct. R. 384(b). 
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remand cases if they are certified as class actions.109 And, interestingly, under 
Michigan’s ad hoc order for the breast-implant litigation, cases were 
automatically remanded following the close of discovery and required 
settlement conferences.110 
5. Appellate Review  
The federal MDL statute provides that any review of the JPML’s 
decisions to consolidate shall be conducted on a petition for a writ of 
mandamus.111 Decisions not to consolidate are not reviewable.112 
A handful of states’ rules provide for special procedures for review.113 
Texas provides that the supreme court has jurisdiction to review orders to 
consolidate or to decline consolidation—but only by extraordinary writ (i.e., 
mandamus) in an original proceeding. The California rule provides that any 
court with jurisdiction under the usual statutes may review a coordination 
decision. Pennsylvania and Virginia expressly provide for review of 
decisions to consolidate, but not decisions to decline consolidation. New 
York prohibits review of the consolidation decision altogether. 
Although a recent proposal has sought to expand interlocutory review, 
the federal MDL statute does not currently provide any special mechanism 
for reviewing the transferee judge’s decisions.114 State MDL systems do not 
appear to be any more enamored of expanded interlocutory review of an 
MDL judge’s decisions. Most state MDL procedures say nothing about 
appeals. Virginia’s MDL statute expressly authorizes interlocutory review in 
consolidated cases, but only in situations where it would be appropriate in 
any case.115 Interlocutory review in Virginia is permitted in any case when 
the trial judge certifies that the decision “involves a controlling question of 
law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that 
an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate 
 
 109 See W. VA. TRIAL CT. R. 26.10.  
 110 See In re Silicone Gel Implant Prod. Liab. Litig., Admin. Order No. 1993-2 (Mich. 1993). Federal 
MDL judges are sometimes criticized for holding onto trial-ready cases in an attempt to orchestrate a 
global settlement, and some scholars have suggested a similar approach of automatically remanding 
nonsettling cases in federal MDLs. See, e.g., Burch, Monopolies, supra note 3, at 152–54.  
 111 28 U.S.C. § 1407(e). 
 112 Id. 
 113 For all relevant provisions, see infra Table A1. 
 114 See Fairness in Class Action Litigation Act of 2017, H.R. 985, 115th Cong. § 105 (2017). For 
trenchant criticism of this proposal, see Andrew D. Bradt, The Looming Battle for Control of Multidistrict 
Litigation in Historical Perspective, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 87 (2018). 
115  VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-267.8(A) (2020). 
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termination of the litigation.”116 The California and Texas MDL rules specify 
which appellate court will have jurisdiction over decisions of the transferor 
and transferee courts, but do not alter the ordinary rules for interlocutory 
appeals.117 Notably, however, Texas’s MDL rules provide that the transferee 
court can overrule the transferor court’s orders, while the transferee court’s 
orders are generally binding after the case is remanded for trial.118 
E. Source of Law 
Finally, we want to pause for a moment on the sources of relevant laws 
governing state MDLs. The federal MDL system is a creature of statute, 
though the JPML has been given the authority to develop its own rules of 
procedure, “not inconsistent with Acts of Congress and the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure.”119 
In the states, MDL was created by statute in California, Connecticut, 
Kansas, Texas, Virginia, and Wisconsin.120 Of these states, California, 
Connecticut, and Kansas are “code states,” meaning that they typically rely 
on the legislature to adopt major rules of procedure.121 
MDL was created by court rule in Colorado, Illinois, Indiana, Maine, 
Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North 
Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and West Virginia.122 
(Tennessee’s local rule is also judge-made, as were the ad hoc orders in 
Michigan, Oklahoma, and South Carolina.) Note that Illinois, New York, and 
North Carolina typically rely on their legislatures to make rules of civil 
 
 116 Id. § 8.01-267.8(B); cf. id. § 8.01-670.1 (providing for interlocutory review in the normal course 
for “a question of law as to which (i) there is substantial ground for difference of opinion, (ii) there is no 
clear, controlling precedent on point in the decisions of the Supreme Court of Virginia or the Court of 
Appeals of Virginia, (iii) determination of the issues will be dispositive of a material aspect of the 
proceeding currently pending before the court, and (iv) it is in the parties’ best interest to seek an 
interlocutory appeal”). Virginia MDL provisions (i) and (iii) track the language in the federal 
interlocutory appeal statute. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). 
 117 In Texas, the appellate court with jurisdiction over the court where the case is pending at the time 
of appeal can review orders of both the transferor and transferee courts. See TEX. R. JUD. ADMIN. 13.9(b). 
In California, the coordination order must specify which appellate court will have jurisdiction over 
appeals if the coordinated actions fall within the jurisdiction of more than one reviewing court. CAL. R. 
CT. 3.505(a). 
 118 TEX. R. JUD. ADMIN. 13.8. 
 119 28 U.S.C. § 1407(f). See generally Bradt, supra note 2, at 871–72, 880–81 (explaining why 
proponents of federal MDL pursued statutory reform rather than seeking to amend the Federal Rules). 
 120 See infra Table A1.  
 121 See generally Zachary D. Clopton, Making State Civil Procedure, 104 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 9–11 
(2018) [hereinafter Clopton, Making State Civil Procedure] (discussing “code states” and “rules states”). 
 122  See infra Table A1. Had we included Maryland, it would be listed among those states relying on 
court rule. See supra note 22. 
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procedure,123 but their consolidation rules were included in other judge-made 
rule sources.124 
F. A Brief Comment on Variation 
This Part has summarized our survey of state MDLs. In so doing, it has 
revealed wide variation in the details of state MDL systems around the core 
notion of intercourt coordination—with substantial discretion vested in 
MDL judges and in those officials or institutions that select the MDL judge. 
We have more to say about the state-to-state variation below, but at this 
point, two preliminary comments are in order. First, we want to express 
caution about reaching firm normative conclusions about the variations we 
described. As discussed in more detail below, there is reasonable 
disagreement about the goals and priorities of state MDL systems, so even if 
we had measurable results of state choices, it would be impossible to offer a 
single answer about which system is “best.” 
That said, a second observation is that the variation in decisional 
authority, consolidation standards, and other features suggests that there may 
be fewer “essential” aspects of an MDL system than some might think. We 
should not, therefore, feel compelled to support every aspect of the current 
federal MDL structure just because a group of federal judges fifty years ago 
thought it would work. Instead, a better approach is to think clearly about 
MDL design and its consequences—a task that we take up below. 
II. CASE STUDIES 
To expand on our survey, in this Part we take a deep dive into the origins 
and operation of three states’ MDL systems: California, Texas, and Indiana. 
We chose California and Texas because they are two of the largest legal 
markets in the nation and both have well-developed institutional MDL 
systems. We chose Indiana because it is an excellent example of a peer MDL 
system in a state with elected judges. 
In these case studies, we examine the history of these states’ adoption 
of an MDL system and the law governing coordinated proceedings. We also 
report some data on how these procedures are used and in which types of 
cases. Additional data are included in the Appendices. We conclude this Part 
 
 123 See Clopton, Making State Civil Procedure, supra note 121, at 10. 
 124 In Illinois, the MDL procedure was adopted as a supreme court rule. See infra Table A1. Illinois’s 
supreme court rules are typically adopted by the court. See ILL. SUP. CT. R. 3. The Illinois legislature 
handles trial court procedure only. See Clopton, Making State Civil Procedure, supra note 121, at 10. For 
New York, the MDL rule is included in the uniform trial court rules, which are judge-made. See infra 
Table A1. For North Carolina, the MDL rule is included in the judge-made General Rules of Practice. 
Infra Table A1.  
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In 1968, Congress adopted the federal Multi-District Litigation Act.125 
Just four years later, in the midst of a perceived litigation crisis and the rise 
of judicial case management, California adopted its MDL statute. The state 
legislature added a new chapter to the Code of Civil Procedure called 
“Coordination,” to be effective on January 1, 1974.126 Elaborating on the new 
code sections were a set of rules of court adopted by the judiciary, also 
effective on January 1, 1974.127 Taken together, these code provisions and 
court rules govern California’s version of MDL, referred to as “Judicial 
Council Coordination Proceedings” or a “Civil Case Coordination 
Proceeding.”128 
The legislative history of the procedure is fairly plain. Charles Hugh 
Warren introduced the proposed coordination procedure in the state 
assembly on March 13, 1972.129 After amendments in the judiciary 
committee,130 the bill passed the assembly on the consent calendar by a vote 
of seventy-six to zero.131 The bill was minimally amended in the state 
senate,132 and the assembly quickly and unanimously concurred in the 
amendments.133 The Governor signed the bill on December 7, 1972.134 
As its origins suggest, the California procedure emphasized efficiency 
and case management. Consistent with broader trends toward managerial 
 
 125 28 U.S.C. § 1407; see generally Bradt, supra note 2 (examining the origins of the federal-MDL 
statute).  
 126 CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 404 et seq. (2021); 1972 CAL. STAT. 2286, 2287. 
 127 See CAL. R. OF CT. 3.501 et seq. (formerly Cal. Rules of Court, rule 1501 et seq.). 
128 See, e.g., Civil Case Coordination, JUD. BRANCH OF CAL., https://www.courts.ca.gov/27922.htm 
[https://perma.cc/6MBU-QQRP]; JUD. COUNCIL OF CAL., CIVIL CASE COORDINATION PROCEEDING 
(JCCP) LOG, https://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/CivilCaseCoord_2015toPresent_JCCPLog.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/JW9P-LU55]. 
 129 CAL. ASSEMB. J. 802 (Mar. 18, 1972).  
 130 CAL. ASSEMB. J. 5022 (June 19, 1972). The bill was re-referred to the Ways and Means 
Committee, and that committee recommended passage without amendment. Id. at 5249 (June 22, 1972); 
id. at 5542 (June 29, 1972). 
 131 CAL. ASSEMB. J. 5846 (July 5, 1972). 
 132 Compare A.B. 930, 1972 Leg. (Cal. 1972), with CAL. ASSEMB. J. 7711 (Nov. 17, 1972); id. at 
7743–44 (Nov. 20, 1972) (reflecting only minimal changes). 
 133 CAL. ASSEMB. J. 7744 (Nov. 20, 1972). 
 134 1972 CAL. STAT. 2286, 2286. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
1678 
judging,135 the code provisions expressly linked coordination to the prospects 
of settlement,136 and the rules suggested that the judge overseeing the 
coordination should “assume an active role in managing all steps of the 
pretrial, discovery, and trial proceedings to expedite the just determination 
of the coordinated actions without delay.”137 According to one early decision, 
the purpose of the coordination procedure was “to promote judicial 
efficiency and economy.”138 
A major innovation in the coordination procedure came with the 1996 
amendments, introduced by State Senator Cathie Wright and passed 
unanimously by the assembly and senate.139 The 1996 amendments linked 
the coordination procedure to a designation in California law for “complex 
cases.”140 The new provisions specified that formal coordination would be 
available only for complex cases, to be defined by the state’s judicial 
council.141  
The history of the “complex” designation is revealing. Although the 
judicial council had considered complex cases at least since the early 
1980s,142 important developments coincided with the 1996 reforms. In that 
year, the California judiciary was considering a proposal to establish a 
special court for business and commercial cases.143 Business courts were 
becoming more popular around the country,144 but after studying the issue, 
 
 135 See generally Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374 (1982) (describing and 
analyzing those trends).  
 136 CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 404.1 (2021). 
 137 CAL. R. CT. 1541(b) (West 1974). 
 138 Citicorp v. Super. Ct., 261 Cal. Rptr. 668, 669 n.3 (Ct. App. 1989). 
 139 1996 Cal. Legis. Serv. 3875 (West). Records of the votes are on file with authors. 
 140 The 1996 amendments also addressed noncomplex cases in response to a flood of requests to the 
judicial council to coordinate noncomplex cases for which no special expertise was required. See S. 
JUDICIARY COMM., CAL. BILL ANALYSIS, S.B. 1726 (1996). The amendments called for trial judges to 
handle noncomplex coordination on their own. Id.; CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 403 (West 2020). For 
noncomplex cases, therefore, California is a “peer MDL” state. 
 141 1996 Cal. Stat. 3875. The Senate Bill Analysis noted: “It is unknown whether the Judicial Council 
has adopted its rules and definition of a ‘complex’ case for purposes of implementing the bill.” S. 
JUDICIARY COMM., CAL. BILL ANALYSIS, S.B. 1726 (1996). 
 142 The category was originally dealt with in Section 19 of the Standards of Judicial Administration 
(effective 1982), which is now CAL. R. CT. Standard 3.10. 
 143 See PAULA L. HANNAFORD-AGOR, NICOLE L. MOTT & TIMOTHY F. FAUTSKO, NAT’L CTR. FOR 
STATE CTS., CAL. ADMIN. OFF. OF THE CTS., EVALUATION OF THE CENTERS FOR COMPLEX CIVIL 
LITIGATION PILOT PROGRAM (2003) (describing the genesis of the specialty business and commercial 
courts in a 1997 task force report); Minutes, Judicial Council Meeting, May 16, 1997, Item 16 (on file 
with journal). 
 144 For a discussion of “business courts” and interstate competition, see infra Section III.A.  
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the task force decided not to recommend them for California.145 Instead, it 
suggested creating a new task force on complex case management.146 The 
task force was charged with defining “complex cases”147 and preparing 
guidance for their active management.148 Later, the judicial council created a 
complex litigation program with special courts in certain jurisdictions.149 The 
linking of the state’s coordination procedure to this new “complex case” 
designation and later to the complex case program developed by the judicial 
council further emphasized active case management and settlement in 
coordinated proceedings.150 
2. Coordinated Proceeding Procedure 
A California civil case coordination proceeding151 begins with a petition 
for coordination submitted to the chair of the judicial council, who is the 
chief justice of California.152 Coordination is only available when complex 
cases are pending in different courts.153 Judges have the ultimate authority to 
determine whether a case is complex.154 
 
 145 See HANNAFORD-AGOR ET AL., supra note 143, at 1; Minutes, Judicial Council Meeting, May 16, 
1997, Item 16 (on file with journal). 
 146 HANNAFORD-AGOR ET AL., supra note 143, at 1. 
 147 See CAL. R. CT. 3.400 et seq. 
 148 This guidance later became the California Deskbook on Complex Civil Litigation Management 
(LexisNexis, Matthew Bender 2005). HANNAFORD-AGOR ET AL., supra note 143, at 2. 
 149 More specifically, in 2000, the judicial council established a pilot program for complex cases in 
six counties. Today, there are at least eight courts with complex litigation programs. See Nathanial Wood, 
Greg Call & Van Nguyen, California’s Complex Court Program, CROWELL & MORING LLP (Jan. 2016), 
https://www.crowell.com/NewsEvents/Publications/Articles/Californias-Complex-Court-Program, 
[https://perma.cc/5D3S-QMGR]. In these complex programs, case management is emphasized and a 
single judge is assigned to handle the entire proceeding. See CAL. R. CT. Standard 3.10(b); id. r. 3.734; 
id. r. 10.950. Only select judges are authorized to hear complex cases. Id. r. 3.10(c). 
 150 See supra notes 140, 149 and accompanying text (discussing complex cases). For another history 
of the California procedure, see Scott Paetty, Classless Not Clueless: A Comparison of Case Management 
Mechanisms for Non-Class-Based Complex Litigation in California and Federal Courts, 41 LOY. L.A. L. 
REV. 845, 847–51 (2008).  
 151 Note that we focus here on the formal coordination procedure for complex cases; the California 
code also uses the term coordination for a trial-judge procedure for noncomplex cases, but we do not 
address it here. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 403 (West 2020). 
 152 Id. § 404; CAL. R. CT. 10.1(a)(1). Petitions may be submitted by the presiding judge in any court 
in which a case is pending, by all plaintiffs or all defendants jointly, or by any party with the permission 
of the presiding judge. Id. r. 3.544. Petitions also specify the preferred site for coordination. See id. r. 
3.521. 
 153 CIV. PROC. § 404. Prior to the merging of trial courts (i.e., municipal, justice, and superior), the 
coordination procedure also was available for cases in different courts in the same county. See 1980 CAL. 
STAT. 654; 1982 CAL. STAT. 798. 
 154 CIV. PROC. § 404; CAL. R. CT. 3.502. The definition of complex cases is provided at CAL. R. CT. 
3.400(a). 
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Upon receipt of a petition, the chief justice designates a “coordination 
motion judge” or authorizes a presiding judge of a court to assign the matter 
to a judge in that court in the usual manner,155 which can vary, but it is not 
necessarily random assignment.156 The coordination motion judge advises 
the chief justice on the coordination decision. According to the statute, 
coordination is appropriate when there is a common question of fact or law 
and coordination would serve the ends of justice.157 
If the coordination motion judge decides that coordination is 
appropriate, the coordination motion judge must suggest a court for the 
coordinated proceeding.158 The chief justice is ultimately responsible for 
selecting a trial court and either selecting a “coordination trial judge” or 
authorizing the presiding judge of the selected trial court to assign the matter 
to a judge in that court in the usual manner.159 
 
 155 CAL. R. CT. 3.501(7); CIV. PROC. § 404.  
 156 CAL. R. CT. 3.10(c) (“In selecting judges for complex litigation assignments, the presiding judge 
should consider the needs of the court and the judge’s ability, interest, training, experience (including 
experience with complex civil cases), and willingness to participate in educational programs related to 
the management of complex cases.”); id. r. 3.734 (“The presiding judge may, on the noticed motion of a 
party or on the court’s own motion, order the assignment of any case to one judge for all or such limited 
purposes as will promote the efficient administration of justice.”); id. r. 10.950 (“The presiding judge . . . 
retains final authority over all criminal and civil case assignments.”); id. r. 10.603(c)(1) (“The presiding 
judge has ultimate authority to make judicial assignments.”); E-mail from Judge Carolyn Kuhl to authors 
(July 4, 2019, 12:15 CST) (on file with journal). Note, also, that parties can seek to overturn the 
assignment with a peremptory challenge. See CAL. R. CT. 3.516; see also Philip Morris Inc. v. Superior 
Ct., 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 671, 672 (Ct. App. 1999) (holding that plaintiffs’ peremptory challenge motion was 
properly granted).  
 157 CIV. PROC. § 404.1; see also Keenan v. Superior Ct., 168 Cal. Rptr. 561, 562 (Ct. App. 1980) 
(interpreting CIV. PROC. § 404.1 in a conflict between an order for coordination of five cases and an order 
from another judge regarding three of those same cases). In so deciding, the coordination motion judge 
is asked to consider  
whether the common question of fact or law is predominating and significant to the litigation; the 
convenience of parties, witnesses, and counsel; the relative development of the actions and the 
work product of counsel; the efficient utilization of judicial facilities and manpower; the calendar 
of the courts; the disadvantages of duplicative and inconsistent rulings, orders, or judgments; and, 
the likelihood of settlement of the actions without further litigation should coordination be denied. 
CIV. PROC. § 404.1. 
 158  CAL. R. CT. 3.530. The Rule specifies that the motion judge should consider: 
“(1) The number of included actions in particular locations; (2) Whether the litigation is at an 
advanced stage in a particular court; (3) The efficient use of court facilities and judicial resources; 
(4) The locations of witnesses and evidence; (5) The convenience of the parties and witnesses; 
(6) The parties’ principal places of business; (7) The office locations of counsel for the parties; 
and (8) The ease of travel to and availability of accommodations in particular locations.” 
Id. 
 159 CIV. PROC. § 404.3; CAL. R. CT. 3.540(a). For a discussion of the “usual manner,” see supra notes 
155–156 and accompanying text. 
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Unlike federal MDL, which is for pretrial proceedings only, California 
cases are coordinated for both pretrial proceedings and trial.160 The 
coordination trial judge is granted the powers of any judge hearing a civil 
case.161 But the rules also specifically call upon the coordination trial judge 
to “assume an active role in managing all steps of the pretrial, discovery, and 
trial proceedings to expedite the just determination of the coordinated actions 
without delay.”162 And the rules provide a sort of checklist of case-
management techniques that the coordination trial judge may wish to use, 
including appointing liaison counsel.163 According to one decision, the 
coordination trial judge is provided “whatever great breadth of discretion 
may be necessary and appropriate to ease the transition through the judicial 
system of the logjam of cases which gives rise to coordination.”164 
The California rules do not mention cooperation with other courts, but 
trial judges have facilitated cooperation with federal MDLs and cases in 
other states. For example, in the vitamin antitrust cases, a coordination trial 
judge in San Francisco oversaw a settlement of state indirect-purchaser 
antitrust cases in parallel with a settlement of direct-purchaser suits in a 
federal MDL.165 Similarly, in the Vioxx litigation, the federal MDL judge 
coordinated with the California state MDL judge throughout the 
 
 160 See supra Section I.C. 
 161 CAL. R. CT. 3.540. 
 162 Id. r. 3.541(b). Judge Kuhl agreed that, especially in coordinated cases, California judges were 
active case managers. See Telephone Interview with Judge Carolyn Kuhl (May 8, 2019) [hereinafter Kuhl 
Interview] (interview notes on file with journal). 
 163 See CAL. R. CT. 3.541, 3.506. 
 164 McGhan Med. Corp. v. Superior Ct., 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d 264, 269–70 (Ct. App. 1992). For an 
example of case management in a coordinated proceeding, consider the Lockheed Litigation Cases, No. 
B262820, 2017 WL 3187676 (Cal. Ct. App. July 27, 2017). More than 600 current and former employees 
of Lockheed sued the company in California state court for personal injuries from chemical exposure. Id. 
at *1. The cases were coordinated, and the coordination trial judge created a group of “pilot” claims to be 
resolved first. Id. The case management order provided that the results of those cases would bind the 
other cases via collateral estoppel. Id. Bellwether trials were held, but, for various reasons, most cases 
remained unresolved after eight years in the trial court—a state of affairs the judge referred to as 
“scandalous.” Id. at *2. In response, the judge took even more aggressive steps, attempting to resolve 
many outstanding evidentiary issues (including general causation) and to apply those decisions to all 
unresolved cases. After decades in court, and relying heavily on these all-case determinations, the 
coordination trial court was able to resolve all coordinated claims. Id. at *2–3. 
 165 See In re Vitamin Cases, 2 Cal. Rptr. 3d 358 (Ct. App. 2003); In re Vitamins Antitrust Litig., 
209 F.R.D. 251 (D.D.C. 2002). Indirect purchasers may not recover under federal antitrust law, but they 
may recover under California law. See Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 735 (1977); CAL. BUS. & 
PROF. CODE § 16750(a) (West 2020). 
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proceeding.166 And it is only a matter time before the newly selected 
California opioid judge is coordinating with the federal MDL judge in Ohio. 
3. The Data 
The Judicial Council of California collects data on civil case 
coordination proceedings, and the office generously provided a selection of 
those data for purposes of this study.167 We analyze below petitions disposed 
of from January 1, 2014 through May 22, 2019, a period of roughly five-and-
a-half years. 
a. Petitions and dispositions 
During our period of study, California received at least 223 petitions for 
civil case coordination. The state granted 163 of those petitions,168 denied or 
dismissed at least 47 petitions, and at least 13 petitions were withdrawn 
before disposition.169 These numbers suggest a grant rate of about 78%, on 
par with the grant rate in federal MDL for most of its history, but higher than 
the federal rate in recent years.170 
b. Case type 
We attempted to categorize the subject matter of the 163 granted 
petitions, relying on case names and secondary sources.171 By far the largest 
category was wage-and-hour (employment) petitions, which numbered at 
least 79 (48%). There were at least 29 (18%) products liability petitions, and 
at least 14 (9%) mass-accident or tort petitions, totaling at least 26% of 
petitions sounding in tort. We also found at least 13 (8%) consumer law 
petitions and 9 (6%) investor or corporate law petitions. The remaining 19 
petitions dealt with privacy, probate, environmental, and contract law, 
among other subjects. This information is displayed in Figure 2. 
These results depart from the early history of California procedure: a 
study of the first 100 petitions for civil case coordination found that almost 
40% were personal-injury petitions, with little if any employment 
 
 166  In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., No. CIV. 05-4578, 2010 WL 724084, at *2 (E.D. La. Feb. 18, 
2010). For more on Vioxx, see infra note 366 and accompanying text. 
 167 Full dataset is on file with the authors.  
 168 Although we do not have data on this point, one experienced judge estimated that parties agreed 
to coordination in 80% of cases in which coordination petitions were granted. See Kuhl Interview, supra 
note 162. 
 169 There were more ambiguities in the not-granted category, which is why we use the “at least” 
construction. 
 170 See Clopton & Bradt, Party Preferences, supra note 3, at 1724 & n.56; Williams & George, supra 
note 3, at 433 fig.1. 
 171 For more detail, see infra Appendix B.  
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litigation.172 Further, while the federal JPML almost never consolidates 
public law cases, California has coordinated public law cases on multiple 
occasions, including cases challenging California’s treatment of same-sex 
marriage.173 
FIGURE 2: CALIFORNIA COORDINATED PROCEEDINGS BY TYPE 
 
To help compare the subject matter of California cases to federal MDL, 
Figure 3 below reflects the compiled category data for federal MDLs 
pending in February 2021.174 While California’s coordinated proceedings are 
dominated by wage-and-hour cases, employment comprises only a small 
fraction of federal MDLs. Products liability cases, which are thought of as 
the engine of federal MDL, represent a substantially smaller share of 
California coordinated proceedings.175 
 
 172 Alexander B. Yakutis, Multicourt Litigation Coordination: The First 100 Petitions, 10 J. 
BEVERLY HILLS BAR ASSOC. 12, 12–15 (1976). 
 173 See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008). For a discussion of the absence of public law 
cases in federal MDL, see Bradt & Clopton, MDL v. Trump, supra note 4, at 924–27. 
 174 U.S. JUD. PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIG., MDL STATISTICS REPORT - DOCKET TYPE 
SUMMARY (2021), https://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/sites/jpml/files/Pending_MDL_Dockets_By_MDL_ 
Type-February-17-2021.pdf [https://perma.cc/7AED-X4BV]. 
 175 Note that these results treat each coordinated case or MDL as a unit, but of course not all 
coordinated cases or MDLs are created equal. Some MDLs contain many more consolidated actions and 
parties than others. For more on this point on the federal side, see Clopton, MDL as Category, supra note 
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FIGURE 3: FEDERAL MDLS BY TYPE 
 
c. Courts and judges 
We then turned our attention to the courts and judges selected to 
participate in California MDL. These choices have been a point of interest 
in the study of federal MDL, so we provide substantial additional detail in 
Appendix B. 
Briefly, California coordinated proceedings were frequently, though 
not always, created in large population centers. Los Angeles County led the 
way with 63 (39%). The chief justice appeared to make appointments 
directly in about one-quarter of cases, relying on the motion judge or the 
local district in three-quarters. There were some “repeat players” among 
coordination motion and trial judges but also some new blood among 
appointees. For example, 55 different judges served as trial judges, with no 
judge handling more than 11 coordinated proceedings. 
Of the trial judge assignments, 55 (36%) were to female judges and 99 
(64%) were to male judges.176 These results are roughly on par with a recent 
study of federal judges selected to handle MDLs.177 They are almost perfectly 
 
 176 Among the cases assigned directly by the chief justice, though, female coordination trial judges 
were assigned in 58% of cases (14 of 24). Infra Appendix B. 
 177 See Clopton & Bradt, Party Preferences, supra note 3, at 1739 tbl.5 (finding that, from 2012 to 
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on par with the overall pool of California trial judges, which, according to a 
2018 report, was 36.1% female.178 
One dimension worthy of comment is partisan affiliation. Unlike in 
Texas and Indiana (addressed below), where trial judges are elected in 
partisan elections, California trial judges are elected in nonpartisan 
elections.179 However, it turns out that many judges first joined the bench as 
gubernatorial appointees filling vacancies. Looking only at judges 
previously appointed by governors, we found that slightly more than two-
thirds of coordinated proceedings were assigned to judges appointed by 
Republican governors.180 
d. Parallel federal MDLs 
Finally, we tried to determine whether the California coordinated 
proceedings had corresponding federal MDLs. We did so by hand-checking 
California cases against the JPML’s lists of federal MDLs, as well as 
searching the federal Panel’s orders on Westlaw. We were able to identify 
17 California proceedings with parallel federal MDLs,181 meaning that at 
least 10% of California proceedings had federal analogs.182 Notably, all 17 
were products liability cases, representing more than half of California’s 
products liability proceedings in this period. We also found 5 California 
cases in which the federal Panel had denied motions for consolidation.183 
 
 178 JUD. COUNCIL OF CAL., DEMOGRAPHIC DATA PROVIDED BY JUSTICES AND JUDGES RELATIVE TO 
GENDER, RACE/ETHNICITY, AND GENDER IDENTITY/SEXUAL ORIENTATION (GOV. CODE § 12011.5(N)) 1 
(2018), https://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/2019-JO-Demographic-Data.pdf [https://perma.cc/X7Y6-
2TT8] [hereinafter DEMOGRAPHIC DATA]. Race and ethnicity are more difficult to assess without access 
to judicial records. Using publicly available sources that identify the judges’ race or ethnicity we were 
able to find only eight appointments to nonwhite judges. While our methodology is necessarily imprecise, 
this is lower than the percentage of nonwhite judges assigned federal MDLs in the prior study, see Clopton 
& Bradt, Party Preferences, supra note 3 at 1737 tbl.3, and much lower than the percentage of nonwhite 
California trial judges (34%), see DEMOGRAPHIC DATA, supra, at 1. 
 179 Information on judicial selection in the states is maintained by the National Center for State 
Courts. See Judicial Selection in the States, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS., http://www.judicialselection.us 
[https://perma.cc/X4GV-P4UU]. 
 180 We found 102 cases assigned to trial judges appointed by Republican governors and 50 cases 
assigned to trial judges appointed by Democratic governors. For cases assigned by the chief justice 
directly, we found 40% assigned to judges appointed by Democratic governors and 60% assigned to 
judges appointed by Republican governors. The chief justice during the entire period was an appointee 
of a Democratic governor.  
 181 Of the 17 federal MDLs with California analogs, 4 were consolidated in California district courts. 
Results on file with authors. 
 182 Results on file with authors. We say “at least” because it is possible that other California 
proceedings have federal equivalents that were not discovered by our method. 
 183 Results on file with authors. 
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Texas’s MDL procedure is much newer than California’s. It was 
adopted in 2003 as part of a major tort reform bill, though its origins go back 
at least several years earlier.184 
In 1997, the Texas supreme court adopted Rule 11 of the Texas Rules 
of Judicial Administration,185 which allowed the presiding judge of each of 
the state’s nine administrative judicial regions to assign cases from across 
the region to a single judge for pretrial proceedings.186 But because the rule 
relied on the administrative judicial regions, statewide disputes could not be 
coordinated in a single court; at best, they could be consolidated in front of 
nine judges from the nine different administrative regions.187 
In light of these limits, in 2001, the Texas supreme court enlisted 
Houston trial lawyer Joe Jamail to chair a committee to look into mass 
litigation, among other issues.188 One of the committee’s recommendations 
was an MDL procedure that allowed for statewide consolidation for pretrial 
proceedings and trial,189 though only in courts where venue would have been 
proper for all of the cases.190 
 
 184 For an excellent summary of the drafting history and early functioning of the Texas MDL 
procedure, see Stephen G. Tipps, MDL Comes to Texas, 46 S. TEX. L. REV. 829 (2005). And for our more 
detailed analysis of Texas MDL, see Rave & Clopton, Texas MDL, supra note 10, at 369. 
 185 Lonny S. Hoffman, The Trilogy of 2003: Venue, Forum Non Conveniens & Multidistrict 
Litigation, 24 ADVOCATE 74, 74 (2003). 
 186 TEX. R. JUD. ADMIN. 11. At the time Texas had nine administrative judicial regions. Today it has 
eleven. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 74.042 (West 2019). 
 187 Technically the rule allowed for further consolidation, but Chief Justice Tom Phillips was 
reluctant to use this mechanism. See Hoffman, supra note 185, at 80; see also Hearing of the Supreme 
Court Advisory Committee 8875–76 (Tex. 2003) (statement of Chief Justice Phillips), 
https://www.txcourts.gov/All_Archived_Documents/SupremeCourtAdvisoryCommittee/Meetings/2003
/transcripts/sc06212003.pdf [https://perma.cc/H65S-WMVW]. 
 188 Order Creating the Sup. Ct. Task Force on Civ. Litig. Improvements, Misc. Doc. No. 01-9149 
(Tex. 2001), https://www.txcourts.gov/All_Archived_Documents/SupremeCourt/AdministrativeOrders/ 
miscdocket/01/01-9149.pdf [https://perma.cc/27JJ-P6YP]. 
 189 Letter from Joseph Jamail to Justice Nathan Hecht (Mar. 25, 2003) (draft of Rule 42b.1) 
[hereinafter Jamail Committee Report] (on file with journal); see also Memorandum from Paul Schlaud 
to Supreme Court Task Force (Mar. 15, 2002) (comparing proposed changes to Rule 11 and Rule 42, 
noting that both apply to pretrial and trial MDL coordination) (on file with journal); Memorandum from 
Paul Schlaud to Supreme Court Task Force (Mar. 4, 2002) (on file with journal). 
 190 Jamail Committee Report, supra note 189.  
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Before the Texas supreme court could act on the committee’s 
recommendations, a new Republican majority in the Texas House of 
Representatives introduced House Bill 4 (HB4), a piece of tort reform 
legislation that included MDL provisions. HB4’s MDL provisions had the 
support of defense-side interest groups and were opposed by prominent 
plaintiffs’ lawyers.191 The bill, as amended, provided for an MDL panel, 
appointed by the chief justice, with the power to transfer cases anywhere in 
the state for pretrial proceedings only.192 HB4 passed the Texas house and 
senate, and Governor Rick Perry signed it into law on June 11, 2003.193 
HB4 left most of the details of MDL proceedings to the Texas supreme 
court, so the court’s advisory committee worked quickly to develop MDL 
rules. The advisory committee relied on the statute, the Jamail report, and 
MDL models from the federal courts, California, and Colorado.194 One 
driving concern was that no money had been appropriated to the MDL 
panel,195 so the proposed rules sought to shift burdens from the panel to 
parties and trial courts.196 On August 29, 2003, the Texas supreme court 
adopted MDL procedures in a new Rule 13, and thus began Texas’s MDL 
system.197 
2. MDL Procedure 
A Texas MDL begins when a party or a judge makes a request with the 
MDL panel, appointed by the chief justice. The panel’s standard for creating 
an MDL is broad. Mirroring the federal standard, the cases must share “one  
or more common questions of fact” and the transfer must be “for the 
convenience of the parties and witnesses” and must “promote the just and 
efficient conduct” of the related cases.198 Common questions need not 
 
 191 See HOUSE RSCH. ORG., BILL ANALYSIS, HB4, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND TORT LIABILITY 
REVISIONS 51–52 (2003), https://hro.house.texas.gov/pdf/ba78R/HB0004.PDF [https://perma.cc/63GZ-
2FEW]. 
 192 TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 74.162 (West 2019). 
 193 H.R. 4, 2003 Leg., 78th Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2003), https://capitol.texas.gov/tlodocs/78R/billtext/ 
pdf/HB00004F.pdf#navpanes=0 [https://perma.cc/6SHC-W2GG]. 
 194 Hearing of the Supreme Court Advisory Committee, supra note 187, at 8876–77, 8902–03. 
 195 See, e.g., id. at 9000–01. 
 196 Id. at 9320–21. 
 197 Amendments to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, the 
Texas Rules of Evidence, and the Texas Rules of Judicial Administration, Misc. Docket No. 03-9145 
(Tex. 2003). 
 198 TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 74.162 (West 2019); TEX R. JUD. ADMIN. 13.3(l). The Texas MDL 
panel asks two questions: (1) are the cases sufficiently “related” and (2) would transfer and consolidation 
in front of a pretrial judge serve the goals of convenience and efficiency? See, e.g., In re Tex. Opioid 
Litig., MDL No. 18-0358, slip op. at 4–10 (Tex. J.P.M.L. 2018). The panel has explained that, “[w]hile 
the number of common fact questions necessary to cause cases to be related is not capable of a bright-
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predominate.199 The MDL panel is also responsible for assigning coordinated 
cases: MDLs may be assigned to any active district judge in the state or any 
former or retired district or appellate court judge who has been approved by 
the chief justice.200 
Like the federal MDL system, transfer into a Texas MDL is for pretrial 
purposes only.201 For this reason, in Texas, the MDL transferee court is 
referred to as the “pretrial court,” and the transferor court is referred to as the 
“trial court.”202 The pretrial court is authorized to set aside or modify rulings 
made by the trial court before the transfer occurred.203 And the pretrial judge 
is encouraged to engage in active case management.204 Pretrial judges may 
not try transferred cases on the merits,205 but they are given considerable 
authority to influence proceedings in the trial court after remand.206 Most 
importantly, a trial judge “cannot, over objection, vacate, set aside, or modify 
pretrial court orders”—including those related to the admissibility of expert 
testimony—without the written concurrence of the pretrial judge.207 
The MDL panel also has the power to retransfer pending cases from one 
pretrial court to another.208 This rule is primarily aimed at situations where 
the pretrial judge is no longer available (e.g., because the judge was voted 
out of office),209 but the rule also gives the MDL panel discretion to retransfer 
 
line rule, cases involving complicated, numerous, or significant common fact questions are more likely 
to be considered related.” In re State Farm Lloyds Hidalgo Cnty. Hail Storm Litig., 434 S.W.3d 350, 353 
(Tex. J.P.M.L. 2014). 
 199 Tex. Opioids Litig., supra note 198, at 4; see also In re Volkswagen Clean Diesel Litig., 
516 S.W.3d 704, 708 (Tex. J.P.M.L. 2016) (holding that the relatedness inquiry of Texas Rule of Judicial 
Administration 13 does not require that common questions of fact predominate). 
 200 TEX. R. JUD. ADMIN. 13.6(a). Ordinarily when former, senior, or retired judges are assigned to 
cases in trial court, each party is allowed one objection, which, if exercised, bars that judge from hearing 
the case. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 74.053(b) (West 2019). But no such objections are allowed when 
the MDL panel transfers cases to a former or retired pretrial judge that has been approved by the chief 
justice. See TEX. R. JUD. ADMIN. 13.6(a). The rules also permit the Panel to assign an MDL to multiple 
judges, which it has done on three occasions. See In re Farmers Ins. Co. Wind/Hail Storm Litig., 
481 S.W.3d 422, 425 & n.4 (Tex. J.P.M.L. 2015); In re Farmers Ins. Co. Wind/Hail Storm Litig. 2, 
506 S.W.3d 803, 804 (Tex. J.P.M.L. 2016); In re Chesapeake Barnett Royalty Litig., Admin. Order No. 
15-0113, 2015 BL 107413, at 1 (Tex. J.P.M.L. Apr. 8, 2015). 
 201 TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 74.162 (West 2019); TEX. R. JUD. ADMIN. 13.6(b). 
 202 TEX. R. JUD. ADMIN. 13.2(d)–(e). 
 203 Id. r. 13.6(b). 
 204 Id. r. 13.6(c). 
 205 TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 74.162 (West 2019). 
 206 See TEX. R. JUD. ADMIN. 13.8(a)–(b). 
 207 Id. r. 13.8(b). 
 208 Id. r. 13.3(o). 
 209 See Hearing of the Supreme Court Advisory Committee, supra note 187, at 9230. 
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cases in service of justice and efficiency.210 Regarding this discretion, the 
first chair of the Texas MDL panel remarked that retransfer would allow the 
panel to take an MDL away from a judge “who is not getting the job done.”211 
3. The Data 
The Texas judicial branch does not produce MDL-specific data, so we 
examined the dockets of all MDL cases listed on the Texas panel’s website.212 
This website appears to offer a comprehensive list of all cases in which any 
party has sought state MDL treatment in Texas.213 The results presented 
below are based on our coding of these docket sheets, with some reference 
to other publicly available information about the cases and the judges 
assigned to handle them. 
a. Petitions and dispositions 
From its inception in 2003 until October 2019, the Texas MDL panel 
received 98 requests to consolidate cases into an MDL. The Panel granted 
61 motions and denied 32 motions, with 5 not ruled upon.214 Among decided 
motions, Texas has a 66% grant rate, which is lower than the federal MDL 
grant rate for most of its history but somewhat higher than the federal grant 
rate in recent years.215 
b. Case type 
We next categorized the subject matter of the 61 granted petitions, 
relying on case names, descriptions in the motion or transfer order, and 
secondary sources. Our results are presented in Figure 4 below. 
Almost one-third of Texas MDLs addressed weather-related insurance 
litigation (20 of 61). Although Texas does not provide data on the number of 
cases within MDLs, we have reason to believe that weather-related insurance 
 
 210 TEX. R. JUD. ADMIN. 13.3(o). 
 211 See Hearing of the Supreme Court Advisory Committee, supra note 187, at 9223 (statement of 
Judge David Peeples); see also id. at 9228 (characterizing retransfer as potentially helpful to justice and 
efficiency).  
 212 See Available Multidistrict Litigation Cases, TEX. JUD. BRANCH, https://www.txcourts.gov/ 
about-texas-courts/multi-district-litigation-panel/available-multidistrict-litigation-cases [https://perma.cc 
/4ULA-GVDY]. 
 213 See E-mail from Claudia Jenks, Chief Deputy Clerk of the Supreme Court of Texas, to Ashley 
Arrington (Aug. 26, 2019, 4:04 PM CDT) (on file with journal). 
 214 Full dataset on file with authors. Of those 5 undecided motions, 3 are pending at the time of 
writing, 1 was removed to federal court, and 1 was stayed by a federal bankruptcy court. 
 215 See Clopton & Bradt, Party Preferences, supra note 3, at 1723–24 (finding the federal grant rate 
from 2012 to 2016 to be 57.7%); Williams & George, supra note 3, at 433 (finding the federal grant rate 
from 1968 to 2012 to be roughly 70%–80%). 
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claims also make up a substantial share of Texas MDL measured by cases.216 
Additionally, the Panel granted 14 (23%) products liability petitions, 11 
(18%) mass-accident petitions, and another 3 (5%) miscellaneous tort 
petitions (medical malpractice, defamation, and barratry), for a total of 46% 
of granted petitions sounding in tort law. Other granted petitions addressed 
consumer law, oil and gas law, employment law, investor or corporate law, 
and life insurance. Texas does not appear to have consolidated any public 
law cases,217 though it has consolidated suits brought by the state attorney 
general together with private claims over the state’s objections.218 
FIGURE 4: TEXAS MDLS BY CASE TYPE 
 
We also compared Texas MDLs to federal MDLs pending in February 
2021 (and displayed in Figure 3 above).219 About one-third of federal MDLs 
are products liability cases, while those types of MDLs are less than one-
quarter of Texas’s. Weather-related insurance claims are rare in federal MDL 
 
 216 For more, see Rave & Clopton, Texas MDL, supra note 10, at 380–83.  
 217 Cf. supra note 173 and accompanying text (discussing California and citing a source on federal 
MDL). The Texas panel has rebuffed several efforts to consolidate challenges to various local 
governments’ tax appraisal practices. 
 218 For examples, see the Volkswagen Clean Diesel Litigation and the Texas Opioid Litigation. See 
In re Volkswagen Clean Diesel Litig., 516 S.W.3d 704, 708 (Tex. J.P.M.L. 2016); In re Tex. Opioid 
Litig., No. 18-0358, 2018 BL 211039, at *2 (Tex. J.P.M.L. June 13, 2018). 



















115:1649 (2021) MDL in the States 
1691 
but account for one-third of Texas MDLs. Mass-accident cases make up a 
substantially larger share of Texas MDL proceedings than federal MDLs, 
18% versus 1%.220 
c. Districts and judges 
As with California, we analyzed the districts and judges handling Texas 
MDLs, and we provide many of the results in Appendix C. 
Like California, Texas MDL is largely, though not exclusively, a 
creature of large population centers, with a mix of repeat players and new 
MDL judges. The county with the most MDLs by far was the state’s most 
populous county, Harris County (home to Houston), but MDLs were also 
created in small counties. And while four judges have handled four or more 
MDLs, many MDLs are assigned to first-time pretrial judges.221 Texas 
appoints a smaller proportion of female MDL pretrial judges (28%) than the 
proportion of female Texas trial judges overall (37%), though we hasten to 
add that Texas trial judges are substantially more likely to be women than 
federal district judges (37% in Texas to 28% in the federal courts).222 
Party affiliation is salient in Texas, where judges are elected in partisan 
elections. The five members of the MDL panel are appointed by the chief 
justice of Texas, who is elected in a statewide partisan election. Since the 
Texas MDL procedure began, the chief justice has always been a 
Republican. In that time, the chief justice has always selected a panel with a 
majority of Republican judges, including recent panels with all five members 
being Republican.223 
Party label does not, however, appear to be a major driver in the 
selection of pretrial judges, whose political parties are about evenly split. In 
fact, the Panel has appointed slightly more Democrats than Republicans as 
pretrial judges. These results hold even during recent years when Texas has 
had an all-Republican panel.224 
 
220 Clopton, MDL as Category, supra note 2, at 1317.  
 221 See infra Appendix C. 
 222 For more information on the Texas results and methods, see infra Appendix C. For demographic 
data on federal judges, see Biographical Directory of Article III Federal Judges, 1789-present: Advanced 
Search Criteria, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/search/advanced-search 
[https://perma.cc/2C2C-CPTL]. 
 223 Rave & Clopton, Texas MDL, supra note 10, at 387–88. 
 224 This also tracks the federal experience, where a skewed panel appointed roughly even numbers 
of Democratic- and Republican-appointed transferee judges. See Clopton & Bradt, supra note 3, at 1718, 
1737. 
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d. Retransfer 
One particularly notable feature of Texas MDL is Rule 13.3(o), which 
allows the MDL panel to retransfer cases from one pretrial judge to another 
pretrial judge. The rule contemplates several reasons for retransfer, such as 
when the original pretrial judge has resigned or been defeated in an election, 
but it also allows the panel to act “in other circumstances when retransfer 
will promote the just and efficient conduct of the cases.”225 
There were 17 MDLs where the Panel has retransferred cases, including 
5 in which the MDL was retransferred twice.226 Although the rule allows the 
panel to retransfer cases away from an active judge, the panel does not seem 
to have used its ability to remove an MDL from a pretrial judge “who is not 
getting the job done.”227 Instead, 12 of the 22 retransfers appear to have been 
prompted by the pretrial judge’s retirement, resignation, recusal, or 
ascendance to higher office. The other 10 retransfers occurred after the 
pretrial judge lost an election.228 
Because retransfer after election presents unique considerations, we 
examined those 10 retransfers separately. Although one might expect these 
MDLs to be assigned to the electoral victor, the panel did not assign any of 
these cases to the newly elected judge. Texas law permits approved former 
judges to handle MDLs,229 and in 6 of the 10 cases in which a pretrial judge 
lost an election, the panel retransferred the MDL back to the pretrial judge 
who was voted out. On the 4 other occasions, the panel retransferred cases 
to other judges in the same county.230 
e. Parallel federal MDLs 
Finally, we looked at whether Texas state MDLs had parallel federal 
MDLs. The Texas MDL panel has noted on several occasions that the 
existence of federal MDL supports creating a state MDL.231 We searched the 
 
 225 TEX R. JUD. ADMIN. 13.3(o). 
 226 Results on file with authors. Rave & Clopton, Texas MDL, supra note 10, at 388.  
 227 Cf. supra note 211 and accompanying text (noting Judge Peeples’s concern with the ability of the 
panel to remove judges who are “not getting the job done”). 
 228 Results on file with authors. Rave & Clopton, Texas MDL, supra note 10, at 388. 
 229 See TEX. R. JUD. ADMIN. 13.6(a). 
 230 Results on file with authors. Rave & Clopton, Texas MDL, supra note 10, at 389. 
 231 See, e.g., In re Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC Mortg. Servicing Litig., 286 S.W.3d 669, 673 (Tex. 
J.P.M.L. 2007) (finding the federal JPML’s reasoning for centralizing cases with similar facts to be 
“informative”); In re Ford Motor Co. Speed Control Deactivation Switch Litig., 285 S.W.3d 185, 192 
(Tex. J.P.M.L. 2008) (noting that the cases “share similar common fact issues” with the federal cases and 
that “[t]he reasoning of the federal panel is consistent with ours”); In re Texas Opioid Litig., No. 18-
0358, 2018 BL 211039, at *1, *3 (Tex. J.P.M.L. June 13, 2018) (explaining that centralizing would “make 
it easier to coordinate with the federal MDL”). 
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federal JPML database on Westlaw for key words and parties in the Texas 
MDL captions and tried to match the cases as best we could, relying on the 
transfer orders and other publicly available sources. 
At least 13 Texas MDLs (21%) had parallel federal MDLs.232 Twelve 
of the 13 parallel MDLs (92%) involved products liability claims. The 1 non-




Indiana civil procedure has a peculiar history.234 The Indiana 
constitution empowered the Indiana Supreme Court to make rules of 
procedure, and the legislature echoed this authorization in a 1937 statute.235 
Yet for decades, the Indiana Supreme Court simply did not promulgate a 
complete set of civil rules.236 That was the case until 1969, when the 
legislature enacted rules of civil procedure by statute to go into effect on 
January 1, 1970.237 This apparently motivated the Indiana Supreme Court; 
and on July 29, 1969, the court promulgated its own “similar but not 
identical” rules, also to be effective January 1, 1970.238 The legislature later 
codified the judge-made rules in what has been called “wholly superfluous 
legislation.”239 
The original 1970 court rules included the common provisions for 
consolidation modeled on Federal Rule 42 but did not include any MDL-like 
rule.240 Sometime thereafter, it seems that demand for some sort of 
consolidation procedure grew. As the Indiana Supreme Court would later 
explain, Indiana’s MDL rule “was designed to resolve conflicts that arise 
 
 232 One of the thirteen parallel federal MDLs was consolidated in a federal district court in Texas. 
 233 Rave & Clopton, Texas MDL, supra note 10, at 383–84. For three idiosyncratic cases in which 
the Texas Panel declined to consolidate state cases despite a federal MDL, see id. at 383–84, 383 n.112.  
 234 See John B. Oakley & Arthur F. Coon, The Federal Rules in State Courts: A Survey of State Court 
Systems of Civil Procedure, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1367, 1395 (1986); Charles Alan Wright, Procedural 
Reform in the States, 24 F.R.D. 85, 98 (1959); Clopton, Making State Civil Procedure, supra note 121, 
at 50.  
 235 Oakley & Coon, supra note 234, at 1395 n.141; Wright, supra note 234, at 98. 
 236 Oakley & Coon, supra note 234, at 1395 n.141; Wright, supra note 234, at 98. 
 237 Oakley & Coon, supra note 234, at 1395 n.141. 
 238 Id. 
 239 See id. 
 240 See id. at 1395. 
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‘[w]hen civil actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending 
in different courts.’”241 
Although records are scarce—not uncommon for judicial rulemaking in 
the states242—it appears that the Indiana Supreme Court was considering 
creating a peer MDL system in 1989, if not earlier.243 The initial proposal 
was to add a rule that would permit the consolidation of actions involving 
common questions of law or fact pending in different courts. This proposal 
was forwarded to the Indiana Supreme Court Committee on Rules of Practice 
and Procedure, which offered two meaningful changes. First, the original 
proposal provided for sua sponte consolidation, but the committee 
recommended that parties should be required to request consolidation.244 The 
committee explained that “[t]he purpose of the revision is to prevent a court 
from acting on its own to effect consolidation.”245 The supreme court 
accepted this recommendation.246 Second, the committee recommended 
adding language to the rule, providing that cases were to be remanded to the 
original courts unless the consolidating court concluded that they involved 
unusual or complicated issues—in other words, a presumption of 
consolidation for pretrial purposes only, but an option for the MDL court to 
exercise discretion to keep cases for trial.247 The supreme court accepted this 
recommendation as well.248 
On November 13, 1989, the Indiana Supreme Court adopted Rule 
42(D), making it effective on January 1, 1990.249 The rule today is, for all 
practical purposes, the same as in 1990.250 
 
 241 State ex rel. Curley v. Lake Cir. Ct., 899 N.E.2d 1271, 1272 (Ind. 2008) (quoting IND. R. TRIAL 
P. 42(D)). 
 242 Clopton, Making State Civil Procedure, supra note 121, at 35–36. 
 243 See IND. SUP. CT. COMM. ON R. PRAC. & PROC., COMMITTEE MINUTES (Aug. 25, 1989) 
[hereinafter MINUTES] (on file with journal). 
 244 See id. 
 245 Id. But see Appellant’s Brief at 7, Farno v. Ansure Mortuaries of Ind., LLC, 953 N.E.2d 1253 
(Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (No. 41A05-1002-PL-00104) (suggesting that the trial court had consolidated cases 
sua sponte).  
 246 Order Amending Rules of Trial Procedure (Ind. 1989) [hereinafter Order] (on file with journal).  
 247 MINUTES, supra note 243. It is unclear whether the original proposal did not provide for remand 
at all or provided for remand without this option. All we can tell from the scant minutes is that the 
Committee recommend the remand-with-option language.  
 248 Order, supra note 246.  
 249 Id.  
 250 Compare IND. R. TRIAL P. 42(D), with Order, supra note 246 (reflecting minimal differences).  
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2. Consolidation Procedure 
Indiana’s peer MDL procedure begins with a Rule 42(D) motion to 
consolidate.251 When civil actions in different courts share common issues of 
law or fact, any party to any of the actions may request consolidation.252 The 
moving party must file the motion in the court with the first-filed action.253 
Although the rule specifies that parties must request consolidation, there is 
at least some evidence that Indiana trial courts have consolidated cases sua 
sponte,254 directly contradicting the intent of the committee’s revision.255 
The court receiving the motion has the discretion to decide whether 
consolidation is appropriate. Technically, the rule provides that the court 
“shall enter an order . . . unless good cause to the contrary is shown and 
found by the court to exist,”256 but the Indiana Court of Appeals has remarked 
that “the decision to consolidate is purely discretionary and will not be 
overturned absent a manifest abuse of discretion.”257 The first-filed court, 
though, retains its ability to stay or dismiss its case, which then hands 
consolidation authority over to the court with the next-earliest-filed action.258 
Like federal MDL, Indiana Rule 42(D) specifies that consolidation is 
for “discovery and any pre-trial proceedings.”259 However, unlike federal 
MDL, Indiana Rule 42(D) also specifies an escape hatch. The consolidated 
court may enter an order consolidating cases for trial if “the action involves 
unusual or complicated issues of fact or law or involves a substantial 
question of law of great public importance.”260 This determination is left to 
the court hearing the consolidated proceeding.261 Further empowering the 
first-filed court, Rule 42(D) also formally suspends the normal ability of a 
party to seek a change of venue during the consolidated proceeding.262 So, 
 
 251 IND. R. TRIAL P. 42(D); see also Stern v. Gresk, 583 N.E.2d 178, 179 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991).  
 252 IND. R. TRIAL P. 42(D). 
 253 Id. The rule also specifies how to determine which action is filed first. See id. 
 254 See, e.g., Appellant’s Brief, supra note 245, at 7 (“On June 30, 2009, the Johnson Circuit Court 
sua sponte ordered the Class Action consolidated for trial purposes with the other three actions . . . .”).  
 255 See supra note 245 and accompanying text.  
 256 IND. R. TRIAL P. 42(D) (emphasis added).  
 257 City of New Haven v. Allen Cnty. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 694 N.E.2d 306, 313 (Ind. Ct. App. 
1998). 
 258 IND. R. TRIAL P. 42(D); see also Est. of Hamblen v. Jewell, 772 N.E.2d 1003, 1006 (Ind. Ct. App. 
2002). 
 259 IND. R. TRIAL P. 42(D). 
 260 Id. 
 261 Id. 
 262 Id.; see also Stern v. Gresk, 583 N.E.2d 178, 180 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that a litigant 
could not seek change of venue during consolidation period). 
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unlike a federal MDL judge, it is possible for an Indiana judge to preside 
over all consolidated cases through trial. 
3. The “Data” 
As with California and Texas, we endeavored to collect data on the use 
of state MDL in Indiana. However, after substantial conversations with 
various state officials, we determined that Indiana does not keep any 
statewide records on the use of the Rule 42(D) consolidation procedure. As 
discussed in more detail below, this is consistent with our impressions of 
peer MDL overall. 
Westlaw includes fewer than twenty decisions discussing Rule 42(D) 
since its adoption,263 but this likely understates the frequency with which the 
rule is invoked. Rule 42(D) is implemented by trial court order, and such 
orders are not routinely published. This suggests to us that peer MDL 
procedures will tend to be less transparent than institutional ones. 
In any event, in the absence of “big data,” we report here on some 
illuminating “anecdata.” The Rule 42(D) cases address many different 
subjects, including family law, securities law, corporate and business law, 
property law, election law, and insurance law.264 Among these, Indiana courts 
consolidated public law cases related to early voting in the 2008 election265 
as well as public and private securities claims.266 
In addition, the following exemplary case highlights some salient 
features of Rule 42(D).267 Warren Buchanan filed a class action in Parke 
Circuit Court against Penn Central Corporation and U.S. Railroad Vest 
Corporation, seeking “to quiet title to [an] abandoned railroad right-of-way” 
on behalf of all affected landowners throughout the state.268 A couple months 
later, Fern Firestone filed a similar class action in Hamilton County, but also 
included additional claims of conversion, fraud, and racketeering.269 Two 
months after that, Buchanan filed a motion to amend his complaint to include 
the same additional claims, and on the same day the trial court preliminarily 
 
 263 Results on file with authors. 
 264 Results on file with authors. 
 265 State ex rel. Curley v. Lake Cir. Ct., 899 N.E.2d 1271 (Ind. 2008); cf. supra notes 173, 217 and 
accompanying text (discussing public law cases in California and lack thereof in Texas and federal MDL).  
 266 Farno v. Ansure Mortuaries of Ind., LLC, 953 N.E.2d 1253, 1263 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011).  
 267 The following is drawn from a series of published decisions on the litigation, including State ex 
rel. Firestone v. Parke Cir. Ct., 621 N.E.2d 1113 (Ind. 1993); Hefty v. All Other Members of the Certified 
Settlement Class, 680 N.E.2d 843 (Ind. 1997).  
 268 See Firestone, 621 N.E.2d at 1114.  
 269 See id. at 1114 & n.1.  
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approved a class action settlement with Buchanan as class counsel.270 Upon 
learning of the settlement, Firestone unsuccessfully sought to intervene in 
the Buchanan action and, at the same time, obtained certification of his 
separate statewide class in the Hamilton action.271 Buchanan then went back 
to the first-filed court and obtained an order under Rule 42(D) consolidating 
the actions in Parke and dissolving the Hamilton certification order.272 The 
Rule 42(D) consolidation was appealed all the way up to the Indiana 
Supreme Court, which eventually approved of the first-filed judge’s use of 
the rule.273 
The parties continued to litigate the merits of the settlements,274 but the 
role of Rule 42(D) was clear. On the one hand, Rule 42(D) helped avoid 
inconsistent rulings and dueling class actions by consolidating the lawsuit 
into a single proceeding. On the other hand, Rule 42(D) essentially chose 
winners and losers—it empowered the first-filed judge in the Parke Circuit 
Court to decide whether to absorb the Hamilton County action, and in so 
doing, to reward Buchanan at the expense of Firestone. And it gave the first-
filed judge the exclusive power to approve and enforce a class action 
settlement that would resolve a statewide dispute and essentially wipe out 
the other consolidated claims.  
D. Other States 
Finally, although we have not worked up full case studies on all states’ 
MDL procedures, we report here our best efforts to determine the frequency 
with which states have used them. This information is drawn from all thirteen 
institutional MDL states (as of fall 2020). The information provided was not 
always in the same form, making apples-to-apples comparisons difficult. But 
the brief sketch below provides some context: 
 California’s MDL is the most frequently used, hearing at least 
223 motions (and granting 163) in the last five and a half 
years.275 
 Colorado received about 224 petitions during the last ten 
years.276 
 
 270 Id. 
 271 See Hefty, 680 N.E.2d at 847. 
 272 See Firestone, 621 N.E.2d at 1114–15. 
 273 See id. at 1115. 
 274 Hefty, 680 N.E.2d at 851–57. 
 275 See supra Section II.A.3 (describing sources and data). 
 276 COLO. JUD. BRANCH, COLORADO JUDICIAL BRANCH ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT FISCAL 
YEAR 2019, at 5, https://www.courts.state.co.us/userfiles/file/Administration/Planning_and_Analysis/ 
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 Illinois granted 50 petitions since 2014.277 
 Texas received 98 petitions and granted 61 since 2003.278 
 Minnesota received 62 petitions and granted 32 since 2003.279 
 Kansas received 15 petitions and granted 9 since 2009.280 
 New York consolidated at least 24 cases since 2002.281 
 New Jersey has 23 pending MDLs.282 
 West Virginia had 11 pending MDLs as of 2018.283 
 The Virginia supreme court has only formed a panel to decide 
on MDL four times in its history.284 
 In North Carolina, the chief justice has created 2 pending 
MDLs (comprising 11 and 2 cases respectively).285 
 Representatives of the Connecticut and Oregon judiciaries 
indicate that their systems are rarely if ever used. In the fall of 
2019, the Connecticut courts reported that the current chief 
court administrator had never used the authority,286 and the 
Oregon Supreme Court reported that it had not used its power 
since at least 2006.287 
 
Annual_Statistical_Reports/2019/FY2019AnnualReportFINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/3YLE-UMVG]. 
We say “about” because we are relying on reports from ten fiscal years, rather than calendar years. 
 277 These data were provided by the Illinois Supreme Court Clerk’s Office. On file with authors. 
 278 See supra Section II.B.3 (describing sources and data). 
 279 These data are based on a report provided to authors by the Minnesota State Law Library, cross-
referenced with the Case Management System, MINN. APP. CTS., http://macsnc.courts.state.mn.us/ 
ctrack/publicLogin.jsp [https://perma.cc/JM3S-5KGT]. 
 280 These data are based on information provided by the Kansas Clerk of the Appellate Courts. On 
file with authors. 
 281 We compiled these results from Decisions of the Litigation Coordinating Panel, N.Y. STATE 
UNIFIED CT. SYS., http://ww2.nycourts.gov/courts/1jd/supctmanh/LCP/Decisionslist.shtml 
[https://perma.cc/NF3G-K53Z], and underlying documents in each of the listed cases. We also confirmed 
with the First Judicial District that this list was comprehensive and up-to-date. 
 282 See Multicounty Litigation, N.J. CTS., https://www.njcourts.gov/attorneys/mcl/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/F4Q5-9RBZ]. 
 283 See W. VA. JUDICIARY, 2018 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE MASS LITIGATION PANEL, 
http://www.courtswv.gov/lower-courts/mlp/2018AnnualReport-MassLitigation.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
ANA3-TCXV]. 
 284 This result was provided to authors by the Virginia State Law Library, Supreme Court of Virginia. 
On file with journal. 
 285 This information was provided to authors by the Supreme Court of North Carolina; see also N.C. 
ADMIN. OFF. CTS., REPORT ON NORTH CAROLINA BUSINESS COURT, N.C.G.S. 7A-343(8A) (2020) (on 
file with journal) (providing general information on the court’s business). It is possible that other cases 
were consolidated automatically (i.e., without chief justice intervention) under other North Carolina 
procedures, but we were unable to gather any relevant data on such cases. 
 286 On file with journal. 
 287 On file with journal. 
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We also tried to gather this sort of data for peer MDL states using 
similar methods, though we were not able to obtain any meaningful results. 
The most common response was that the statewide authorities that typically 
house state court data do not collect this local court information. Perhaps not 
surprisingly, decentralizing the consolidation decisions to local courts also 
makes it more difficult to get a clear picture of what is happening across the 
state. Systemic transparency, in other words, may be lost in peer MDL. 
Finally, we also studied the role of state MDLs in a single large dispute: 
the opioid litigation. (We report these results in full in a separate article.288) 
While the federal opioid MDL has garnered most of the headlines,289 our 
findings further highlight the important role of state MDLs in nationwide 
disputes. When Purdue Pharma declared bankruptcy during the pendency of 
the litigation, it asked a federal bankruptcy court to stay pending lawsuits 
against it.290 Although the majority of such suits were in the federal MDL, 
more than 400 cases were pending in state courts in almost every state.291 
And of those cases, more than three-quarters were consolidated in state 
MDLs in a mix of institutional and peer states.292 
III. ASSESSMENT 
The previous Parts created a taxonomy of state MDLs and delved more 
deeply into some examples. This Part is a first cut at making something of 
those findings. 
We resist the temptation, though, to reach normative conclusions such 
as “Texas good, California bad.” Such assessments are simply not possible 
at this point: we lack comparable data among states, and there are no 
consensus metrics that could guide comparisons even if we had those data. 
Indeed, it would not be unreasonable for lawmakers to weigh the potential 
purposes of consolidation differently such that different MDL procedures 
would be better for different states.293 
 
 288 See generally Clopton & Rave, Opioid Cases and State MDLs, supra note 14, at 4–22 (collecting 
information on state-court opioid cases and analyzing those results). 
 289 See, e.g., Jan Hoffman, Can This Judge Solve the Opioid Crisis?, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 5, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/05/health/opioid-crisis-judge-lawsuits.html [https://perma.cc/6TSY-
TDEY] (describing federal MDL judge Dan Aaron Polster). 
 290 See Complaint for Injunctive Relief at 25–26, In re Purdue Pharma L.P., No. 19-23649 (RDD) 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 2019). 
 291 See Clopton & Rave, Opioid Cases and State MDLs supra note 14, at 4–5.  
 292 See id. (collecting data and sources). 
 293 Even with respect to normatively charged concepts such as “forum shopping,” there is no 
agreement about optimal levels. See, e.g., Pamela K. Bookman, The Unsung Virtues of Global Forum 
Shopping, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 579, 579 (2016) (discussing the unappreciated functions of forum 
shopping). 
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If we think about our survey as a menu of options, however, then it is 
valuable to assess the tradeoffs inherent in these different institutional-design 
choices. On first glance, the proliferation of state MDLs brings to mind other 
innovations in court design through which jurisdictions compete for judicial 
business. In Section A, we explain why interjurisdictional competition is a 
surprisingly poor fit for state MDLs. Upon reflection, it makes more sense 
to think about state MDLs primarily within the context of intrastate political 
economy and political authority—and to think about the choices among state 
MDL designs along these dimensions. In Section B, we explore state choices 
about MDLs in the context of competition between plaintiff and defendant 
interests. In Section C, we consider the impact of state MDLs on judicial 
authority and political accountability. Although we think that state MDLs 
are products of these intrastate dynamics, they also have potential effects for 
cases that have state–federal or state–state components. In Section D, we 
consider the role of state MDL in the potential competition between federal 
and state actors within disputes. Finally, in Section E we explain how state 
MDLs can be fertile ground for cooperation across state lines and among 
federal and state judges when resolving large controversies.  
A. Interstate Political Economy? 
With fifty state judiciaries and the federal courts as candidates for 
complex litigation, there would seem to be ample opportunity for 
jurisdictional competition, or so-called “forum selling.”294 In a leading 
article, Professors Daniel Klerman and Greg Reilly observe: “For diverse 
motives, such as prestige, local benefits, or re-election, some judges want to 
hear more of certain types of cases. When plaintiffs have a wide choice of 
forum, such judges have incentives to make the law more pro-plaintiff 
because plaintiffs choose the court with the most pro-plaintiff law and 
procedures.”295 From common law claims in early modern England to patent 
cases in the Eastern District of Texas, Klerman and Reilly (and others) 
 
 294 Daniel Klerman & Greg Reilly, Forum Selling, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 241, 245, 299–300 (2016); see 
also Todd J. Zywicki, Is Forum Shopping Corrupting America’s Bankruptcy Courts?, 94 GEO. L.J. 1141, 
1146 (2006); LYNN M. LOPUCKI, COURTING FAILURE: HOW COMPETITION FOR BIG CASES IS 
CORRUPTING THE BANKRUPTCY COURTS 138 (2005); J. Jonas Anderson, Court Competition for Patent 
Cases, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 631, 634 (2015); Matthew D. Cain & Steven Davidoff Solomon, A Great 
Game: The Dynamics of State Competition and Litigation, 100 IOWA L. REV. 465, 469 (2015); John F. 
Coyle, Business Courts and Interstate Competition, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1915, 1959 (2012); Daniel 
Klerman, Jurisdictional Competition and the Evolution of the Common Law, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1179, 
1179 (2007) (emphasizing that the English common law system incentivized jurisdictional competition). 
 295 Klerman & Reilly, supra note 294, at 242.  
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observe jurisdictional competition across a range of areas.296 And many 
scholars and policymakers have explained the rise of “business courts” by 
reference to this form of competition.297 
One might think that the sorts of complex disputes that make up many 
MDL proceedings would be prime candidates for forum selling. Complex 
cases can generate revenue for local lawyers and service providers. And 
federal judges, at least, tend to view MDL assignments as prestigious and 
desirable for a variety of reasons.298 Could states, therefore, be competing 
with each other for the kind of complex litigation that ends up in MDL?  
We don’t think so. First, our study of the legislative history of MDL in 
California, Texas, and Indiana, is consistent with the view that jurisdictional 
competition was not a primary driver.299 We also observe, though without 
scientific rigor, that the most well-developed consolidation procedures 
mostly have arisen in states that seemingly have the most cases to 
consolidate, consistent with the idea that consolidation serves other goals.300 
Conceptually, we also think it is unlikely that interstate competition 
drives the adoption or design of state MDL. The primary concern of forum-
selling critics is that courts will try to attract business by appealing to 
plaintiffs and their attorneys.301 The current rules of federal jurisdiction, 
however, mean that most cases worth competing over—cases with some 
interstate elements and large possible recoveries—are also going to be 
candidates for federal jurisdiction, especially since the Class Action Fairness 
Act was adopted in 2005.302 So even if a state were to make its MDL process 
extremely friendly to plaintiffs, attempts to forum shop into that state would 
 
 296 See supra note 294 (collecting sources).  
 297 See generally Coyle, supra note 294 (evaluating the design of business courts).  
 298 See Gluck, supra note 3, at 1698. 
 299 See supra Sections II.A.1, II.B.1, II.C.1. 
 300 See supra Section I.A. As a very rough proxy, states with larger populations are more likely to 
have MDL systems. Among states in the top quartile by population, only Florida, Ohio, and Georgia have 
no form of MDL (and Ohio has actively considered one). Among the bottom quartile by population, only 
Maine, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and West Virginia have state MDLs (and only West Virginia’s is 
an institutional MDL). Compare supra Section I.A (listing states by MDL form), with Vintage 2019 
Population Estimates, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (2019), https://www.census.gov/search-results.html?q= 
2020+population+estimates+by+state&page=1&stateGeo=none&searchtype=web&cssp=SERP&_chars
et_=UTF-8 [https://perma.cc/N8HB-QE56] (consolidating tables of state population estimates). 
 301 See supra note 294 (collecting sources).  
 302 See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (arising under jurisdiction); 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (diversity of citizenship 
jurisdiction); 28 U.S.C. § 1369 (multiparty, multiforum jurisdiction); Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 
Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005) (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.) (CAFA). This is 
especially true given recent decisions finding that some state MDLs are “mass actions” removable under 
CAFA. See supra note 92 and accompanying text. 
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likely be met with a defendant’s notice of removal to federal court.303 To be 
sure, there will be cases amenable to jurisdiction in multiple states and for 
which removal would be unavailable,304 but we suspect this group of cases is 
small enough that it would be unlikely to drive competition-based law 
reform.305 And that group of cases may be getting even smaller in the wake 
of the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent cases constricting personal jurisdiction.306 
We also do not think that states are likely competing with each other 
for MDL’s repeat players. Critics of federal MDL worry that consolidation 
favors institutional defendants and the most powerful plaintiffs’ attorneys 
over small-time players.307 Regardless of whether this account of federal 
MDL is correct, there are at least two reasons to doubt that there is interstate 
competition for these repeat players. First, the institutional players at the 
center of this narrative prefer centralization, so federal MDL—which offers 
nationwide, not just statewide, consolidation—is almost always going to win 
out.308 Second, even if a state could develop a repeat-player-friendly MDL, 
that state could not pull in cases filed in other states, which is exactly where 
nonrepeat players would file suit in this hypothetical world.309 In other words, 
the lack of a 28 U.S.C. § 1407 equivalent for coordinating state court cases 
 
 303 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441, 1446. 
 304 See Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp., 134 S. Ct. 736, 741–46 (2014) (holding that 
state parens patriae actions are not “mass actions” for purposes of CAFA). 
 305 For example, even though state attorney general (AG) suits might avoid CAFA, see id., and even 
though state AGs may sue in other states’ courts, see Zachary D. Clopton, Diagonal Public Enforcement, 
70 STAN. L. REV. 1077, 1096–1101 (2018), we expect that most AGs prefer to sue in their home courts. 
 306 See, e.g., Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1780–82 (2017) (limiting 
specific personal jurisdiction); Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 125–33 (2014) (limiting general 
personal jurisdiction); Bradt & Rave, Aggregation on Defendants’ Terms, supra note 88, at 1272–74 
(arguing that the Court’s attempts to limit personal jurisdiction will drive more cases into federal MDL). 
Personal jurisdiction is not a limit for federal MDL in any given state because MDL courts can rely on 
personal jurisdiction from the transferor court. Id. at 1296; see also Andrew D. Bradt, The Long Arm of 
Multidistrict Litigation, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1165, 1172 (2018) (explaining the JPML’s view that 
the transferor court’s personal jurisdiction reach is controlling). 
 307 See generally, e.g., Burch, Monopolies, supra note 3 (arguing that repeat players, including 
defendants and lead plaintiffs’ lawyers, may prioritize positive outcomes for each other to the detriment 
of plaintiffs); Mullenix, supra note 3 (arguing that plaintiffs’ counsel and defense counsel have a shared 
interest in exploiting the MDL structure to resolve disputes outside class action restraints). But see 
generally Bradt & Rave, It’s Good to Have the “Haves,” supra note 3, (arguing that repeat-player 
plaintiffs’ lawyers can serve as a valuable counterweight to repeat players on the defense side). 
 308 This preference for centralized federal MDL is the point of the criticisms just mentioned. 
 309 Nonrepeat players might face additional transaction costs in filing in a different court, but we 
suspect that those costs would not typically be so large that they would deter nonrepeat players from 
fleeing a jurisdiction that overtly caters to repeat players. 
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across state lines means that states would be less successful at centralizing 
disputes than the federal courts, even if they tried.310  
In short, therefore, interstate competition does not seem all that relevant 
to state MDL. Instead, we think that more important effects are likely within 
each state (where we turn next) or between state and federal courts (where 
we turn thereafter). 
B. Intrastate Forum Shopping 
States’ choices about their MDL systems can have consequences for 
intrastate political economy. In particular, state MDLs may affect the 
competition between plaintiffs and defendants. While we do not observe 
state MDLs applying specialized rules of procedure that overtly favor 
plaintiffs or defendants,311 seemingly neutral design choices can have the 
effect of tilting the balance between them. 
Most importantly, state MDL rules have consequences for the ability of 
plaintiffs and defendants to shop for judges. Especially given the degree of 
discretion that trial judges typically have in handling pretrial matters and 
managing attorney appointments in complex cases, the identity of the MDL 
judge may swamp many of the differences in procedure that we have 
observed.312 This is all the more so because most complex cases settle before 
any of the judge’s pretrial rulings can be appealed. From the litigants’ 
perspective, the big question will typically be, “Who is the judge that will be 
handling this mass of cases?”313 
Going back to our initial taxonomy, there is a big difference between 
states that have peer MDLs and states that have institutional MDLs. In short, 
the peer MDL models often give plaintiffs more leeway to shop for a 
favorable forum and judge than when no MDL is available. The institutional 
 
 310 We have explained why states are unlikely to compete by favoring plaintiffs or by favoring big 
players. If a state competed by creating a dispute resolution system that maximized everyone’s 
preferences, then all we could do is applaud. 
 311 Cf. Clopton, MDL as Category, supra note 2, at 1311–14, 1325–32 (discussing and criticizing 
proposals for federal MDL-specific rules of procedure). 
 312 Parties may also care about the venue to the extent that it affects the jury pool in cases for which 
a jury would be available. We focus on the selection of judges here in part because the selection of judge 
implies a selection of venue. 
 313 In recounting Representative John Dingell’s famous quote, “I’ll let you write the substance . . . 
you let me write the procedure, and I’ll screw you every time,” to his students, Professor Oscar Chase 
used to add the proviso, “Sure, as long as you let me pick the judges.” (author’s personal recollection). 
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MDL models, by contrast, generally give plaintiffs less leeway to forum 
shop.314 
In the seven states with peer MDL procedures,315 trial judges with 
pending cases are the ones who decide whether and where cases will be 
consolidated. Thus, the decider on the consolidation question will always be 
a judge in a court where some plaintiff has chosen to file a case. And 
seemingly in all of the peer states, cases may only be transferred to courts in 
which a case is pending—again, a set of courts over which plaintiffs have 
some say. 
We assume that plaintiffs and their lawyers will behave strategically in 
light of these features. If plaintiffs’ lawyers coordinate with each other (or 
just think ahead), they can file cases in venues with friendly judges, and then 
ask the friendliest of those judges to consolidate cases from around the state 
either in their own court or in front of another friendly judge. Careful 
plaintiffs’ lawyers could also delay filing in less favorable venues until after 
the consolidation decision is made, and then argue that their later filed cases 
should tag along with the earlier transferred cases. Some peer MDL states 
give plaintiffs the option for even more control. In states where the judge in 
the earliest filed action decides whether and where to consolidate (Indiana, 
Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania),316 plaintiffs’ lawyers can make sure to file 
the first case in the friendliest venue, and then ask that judge to vacuum up 
later filed cases from around the state. 
There are limits, of course, to plaintiffs’ ability to forum shop in these 
peer states. Venue rules and random judicial case assignments within courts 
provide important constraints. Plaintiffs with similar claims are not always 
careful or coordinated enough to make sure early cases are filed in friendly 
forums. And in jurisdictions in which a consolidation motion may be filed in 
any pending case, defendants might request consolidation in the most 
defendant-friendly venue. But the important point for our purposes is that the 
peer MDL model gives plaintiffs some greater degree of control over who 
will decide whether to consolidate the cases and, if so, in front of which 
judge. 
In the institutional MDL model, by contrast, the decider on the critical 
question of whether and where to consolidate cases is some institution other 
than a trial judge with pending cases.317 Some states follow the federal model 
 
 314 To the extent that ad hoc MDL is the product of state high court decision-making, ad hoc states 
will behave like institutional states, though other ad hoc approaches are possible. See supra Section I.A. 
 315 See supra Section I.A (describing these states). 
 316 See infra Table 4. 
 317 See supra Section I.A (describing these states). 
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and give the panel the authority to handpick a specific judge.318 Other states 
disaggregate the forum and judge choices.319 But no matter the details, all of 
these institutional MDL states depart from random assignment320 and 
empower some external institution to handpick the judge who will handle 
the consolidated actions. And that means that plaintiffs lose some of their 
ability to shop for a friendly judge to handle the consolidated actions or a 
friendly judge to decide who that judge will be.321 Indeed, opponents of 
Texas’s institutional MDL provision argued that it “would allow defendants 
to ‘forum shop,’ which [MDL’s] supporters say plaintiffs should not be 
allowed to do.”322 
One can see the consequences of the peer–institutional choice most 
starkly in geographically polarized states with elected judges.323 Assume that 
Democratic judges are more plaintiff-friendly than Republican judges, in at 
least some types of aggregate cases.324 While this is a gross 
oversimplification, it helps illustrate the dynamics that could be at play with 
elected judiciaries and the various interests that appear before them.325 Now 
 
 318 See supra Section I.B. Indeed, in the federal system, identifying a transferee judge with the 
experience and wherewithal to handle a massive litigation is often the most important consideration for 
the JPML. See Williams & George, supra note 3, at 439–40 (cataloging reasons for forum and judge 
selection); Bradt, supra note 306, at 1168 (“It’s not so much a where question, but a who question.” 
(quoting Elizabeth Cabraser, MDL Problems, Proceedings of the Section on Litigation, Annual Meeting 
of the Association of American Law Schools (Jan. 6, 2017) (recording on file with the Association of 
American Law Schools))). Cabraser is a prominent MDL practitioner. 
 319 In New York, the panel picks a transferee court, and then the chief judge of that court chooses a 
specific judge to handle the consolidated actions. In California, the chief justice may pick the transferee 
judge or delegate that decision to the chief judge of the transferee court. See supra Part I. 
 320 For a proposal to integrate random assignment into federal MDL, see Clopton, MDL as Category, 
supra note 2, at 1340–41 (recommending randomization of transferee judges where no compelling reason 
or need for expertise regarding cases exists). For an argument why conscious selection of MDL judges is 
attractive in some types of cases, see Francis E. McGovern & D. Theodore Rave, A Hub-and-Spoke Model 
of Multidistrict Litigation, 84 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 13–16) (on 
file with journal). 
 321 The descriptions of the California and Texas models and the circuitous path of many cases 
demonstrated by this data illustrate the attenuated links between plaintiffs’ forum choice and the 
consolidated proceeding. See supra Part II (describing case studies and data). 
 322 See HOUSE RSCH. ORG., BILL ANALYSIS, HB4, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND TORT LIABILITY 
REVISIONS 52 (2003), https://hro.house.texas.gov/pdf/ba78R/HB0004.PDF [https://perma.cc/63GZ-
2FEW]. 
 323 Certainly, these effects might be visible in other states as well, but these states present particularly 
clear contrasts—and, for reasons taken up in the next Section, they also suggest potential tensions with 
respect to political control and accountability. 
 324 Cf. Burbank & Farhang, supra note 40, at 246–47 (finding that a circuit panel’s ideological 
composition has a strong influence on the certification outcome in federal cases). 
 325 No one doubts that some judges have plaintiff-friendly or defendant-friendly reputations, so if 
you prefer, substitute “plaintiff-friendly” and “defendant-friendly” for “Democratic” and “Republican.” 
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consider Indiana and Texas. Both states are solidly Republican at the 
statewide level but have geographic pockets that are heavily Democratic. 
Both states elect their trial judges in local partisan elections. Texas also elects 
its supreme court justices in statewide partisan elections.326 
In a hypothetical Indiana litigation, plaintiffs might strategically file 
their first case in heavily Democratic Monroe County, and then file a number 
of similar cases throughout the state. Under Indiana’s peer MDL rules, the 
plaintiffs can ask the elected trial judge in Monroe County to consolidate all 
of the later filed cases statewide in her own court.327 Thus, putative Indiana 
plaintiffs can shop for plaintiff-friendly consolidation venues by selecting 
where to file the first case. And unless the plaintiff-friendly judge voluntarily 
relinquishes the cases, the plaintiffs’ choice will stick. 
Compare this result with an analogous case in Texas. Plaintiffs in Texas 
might elect to file as many of their cases as possible in the heavily 
Democratic Starr County in South Texas.328 But as long as at least one related 
case is filed elsewhere in the state, then defendants can ask a panel of judges 
appointed by the Republican chief justice to take those cases away from the 
Democratic Starr County judges and give them to another judge somewhere 
else in the state. Plaintiffs’ ability to select forums and judges is significantly 
reduced once a formal panel gets involved.329 And while defendants are not 
guaranteed an alternative judge of their choice, an institutional MDL at least 
affords them an opportunity to get out of the plaintiff’s chosen forum. 
In sum, choices about MDL design have direct consequences for the 
perennial competition between plaintiffs and defendants. Peer MDLs 
facilitate plaintiff forum shopping and tend to shift power from defendants 
to plaintiffs. Conversely, institutional MDLs inhibit plaintiff forum shopping 
and tend to shift some power away from plaintiffs toward defendants. 
 
 326 Though not a part of peer coordination in Indiana, we note that Indiana’s supreme court justices 
are appointed by the governor from a commission-generated list and are subject to retention elections. 
See About the Court, COURTS.IN.GOV, https://www.in.gov/courts/supreme/about [https://perma.cc/JB5B-
ZR42]. 
 327 See IND. R. TRIAL P. 42(D). An MDL consolidation under Indiana’s Rule of Trial Procedure 
42(D) suspends the parties’ right to move for an ordinary venue transfer for as long as the cases are 
consolidated. See supra note 262 and accompanying text.  
 328 Starr County and the surrounding counties in the Rio Grande Valley have been perennial favorites 
on the American Tort Reform Association’s list of “Judicial Hellholes.” Texas lawyer Tony Buzbee is 
reported to have said, “That venue probably adds about 75% to the value of the case . . . . [W]hen you’re 
in Starr County, traditionally you need to just show that the guy was working, and he was hurt. And that’s 
the hurdle . . . .” See AM. TORT REFORM FOUND., JUDICIAL HELLHOLES (2008),  
http://www.judicialhellholes.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/12/JH2008.pdf [https://perma.cc/CR5X-
76EN]. 
 329 Note also that both states depart from the normal allocation of judicial business, which would 
involve cases remaining in the courts in which they were filed (subject to an individual motion to transfer 
venue). 
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C. Intrastate Judicial Politics 
The previous section explored the consequences of MDL design for 
forum and judge shopping. MDL design also has consequences for the 
allocation of judicial authority within a state, and again, the institutional–
peer division is helpful in interrogating these consequences. As we explain, 
institutional MDL systems reallocate judicial power within a state vertically, 
and peer MDL systems reallocate judicial power within a state horizontally. 
Turning first to institutional MDL states, Table 3 below describes the 
methods of selecting the MDL decider and trial judges in institutional states. 
In every institutional MDL scheme, state-level actors—a panel, the supreme 
court, or the chief justice—decide whether and where to consolidate cases. 
And those state-level actors often pick the judge who will handle the 
consolidated cases. The institutional MDL approach thus reallocates power 
vertically from local judges to state-level ones.330 
TABLE 3: JUDICIAL SELECTION METHOD IN INSTITUTIONAL MDL STATES331 















Selected by appointed 









trial judge or 
consent) 









 330 An important caveat is to be noted. It is, of course, true that states have hierarchical judicial 
systems where state-level appellate courts can overrule the decisions of local trial courts. But not all 
decisions can or will be subjected to appellate review. This is particularly true in aggregate litigation, 
where many of the most important decisions are ones of fact or case management that are committed 
firmly to the trial court’s discretion and where most cases settle before any appeal is taken. We assume 
that the identity of the trial judge matters and that states that elect trial judges in local elections have made 
a conscious choice to devolve the kind of discretion and authority that trial judges wield to the local level. 
331 See supra Section I.B; NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS., supra note 49 (maintaining information on 
MDL decider and trial judge selection in the states).  
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appointed by 






























This vertical reallocation of power to state-level institutions is most 
pronounced in the states in which the trial judges who are losing power are 
themselves tied to local constituencies. As displayed in Table 3, at least ten 
institutional states subject trial judges to some form of local election.332 These 
states have chosen a system that makes judges accountable to local 
constituencies and thus they permit variation among judges across the state. 
Locally elected state trial judges are not “fungible” in the same way that we 
 
 332 To the extent that appointed trial judges are thought to “represent” local constituencies, then the 
same comments apply to them. For example, Colorado and Virginia (among others) require their trial 
court appointees to be residents of the relevant jurisdiction. See NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS., supra note 
49.  
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might think of federal district court judges, who are, by design, not 
accountable to any geographic constituency.333 When a state supreme court, 
or a panel that it selects, transfers cases from one elected trial judge to 
another, it is not simply reallocating judicial business among more-or-less 
fungible judges, like in a federal MDL. Instead, institutional state MDL 
procedures can stamp out the intrastate variation that is part of the state 
system, and they do so only for the subset of cases that qualify for 
consolidation. 
Particularly in states where judges at all levels are chosen through 
partisan elections, it is possible that institutional MDL may become a site of 
contestation between state and local political factions. Those instances are 
not necessarily limited to situations in which one side is engaged in 
aggressive forum shopping. 
Returning to our opening case, imagine that there is a major storm in an 
institutional MDL state such as Texas, where trial judges are elected locally 
and the supreme court chief justice, who selects the MDL panel, is elected 
statewide. Now imagine that a mass of lawsuits over insurance claims from 
the hardest hit city is pending in front of a moderate Republican (or a 
moderately pro-defendant) judge in that city. The judge rules for the 
insurance companies, and the public is outraged. In the next election, the 
judge is defeated and replaced by a Democratic former plaintiffs’ attorney 
who ran on holding insurance companies accountable. A few years later, 
there is another storm and another wave of insurance lawsuits. The voters in 
that city seem to want the new round of litigation to come out a different 
way. But the Texas MDL panel—appointed by the Texas chief justice, a 
Republican who was elected statewide—can take those cases away from the 
newly elected Democratic judge and assign them to some other solidly 
Republican judge elsewhere in the state. (Indeed, at least in Texas, the MDL 
panel can do this even in the middle of a case. If an MDL judge is voted out 
of office, the panel can retransfer the consolidated cases away from that 
judge’s elected successor—and even back to the defeated incumbent!)334 In 
 
 333 But see Hearing of the Sup. Ct. Advisory Comm. 9305 (Tex. 2003) (statement of Chief Justice 
Phillips) (Texas Advisory Committee member and Judge Scott Brister observing that “the concept behind 
MDL is that [state] trial judges are fungible, too”).  
 334 See TEX. R. JUD. ADMIN. 13.3(o), 13.6(a) (allowing former judges approved by the chief justice 
to serve as MDL judges); supra Section II.B.3. This situation is hardly hypothetical. The insurance 
litigation following Hurricane Harvey, for example, was initially assigned to a Republican judge in 
Houston. When that judge lost her next election to a Democratic former plaintiffs’ attorney, the Texas 
MDL panel retransferred the cases back to the defeated incumbent, who had been approved by the chief 
justice to handle MDLs. For a more detailed account, see Rave & Clopton, Texas MDL, supra note 10, at 
391–92, 391 n.143. Indeed, when judges handling MDLs in Texas lose elections, the Texas MDL panel 
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such instances, local constituencies might justifiably object to the state panel 
interfering with their electoral choices—though MDL defenders might say 
that statewide disputes should not be subjected to the whims of one-off local 
elections. 
More generally, an institutional MDL system may empower statewide 
actors to overrule the wishes of locally responsive actors. Sometimes that 
may be a valuable check on local impulses run amok; other times it may 
reflect a power play by a political faction that is more powerful statewide. 
Hopefully, the statewide actors neutrally apply the criteria for deciding when 
to consolidate and where;335 however, our cynical sides acknowledge that 
such discretionary choices at least create opportunities for other factors to 
come into play. Our point here is not to say that local responsiveness and 
control are more important than efficiency and statewide uniformity or vice 
versa. The point is that those different values are implicated by the states’ 
institutional choices.336 
While the potential conflict in institutional MDL states is vertical, in 
peer states, it is horizontal. Recall that peer states empower trial judges with 
pending cases to make consolidation decisions. The ability to consolidate 
cases from other courts means that trial judges exercise “extraterritorial” 
control by reaching outside their districts to grab cases from around the 
state.337 This, too, departs from the background distribution of authority in 
these state systems. Here, some local actors are empowered at the expense 
 
has uniformly transferred the MDLs away from their elected successors, and often back to the defeated 
incumbent. See id. 
 335 Our study of Texas’s MDL system found little evidence that party label was a major driver in the 
MDL panel’s assignment of cases to pretrial judges, but our sample size was small and factors other than 
crass partisanship may, of course, be at play. For more on this issue, see Rave & Clopton, Texas MDL, 
supra note 10, at 392.  
 336 Indeed, most voters may not even be aware that their state has an institutional MDL that could 
undermine their local judicial choice in some cases. The low salience of state MDL might make it a sort 
of procedural backdoor limitation on voters’ rights to elect local judges to hear local cases. 
 337 This argument has parallels to various arguments in federal law, including arguments in favor of 
CAFA and arguments against nationwide injunctions. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff & Catherine M. 
Sharkey, Backdoor Federalization, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1353, 1415–17 (2006) (connecting CAFA to 
extraterritoriality); Memorandum from Attorney Gen. Jefferson Sessions III to Heads of Civ. Litigating 
Components & U.S. Attorneys at 6 (Sept. 13, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-
release/file/1093881/download [https://perma.cc/T2JZ-XR3Q] (“A lower court issuing a nationwide 
injunction effectively takes away from the other courts any opportunity they might have had to resolve 
similar issues pending or soon to come before them.”). 
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of other local actors. And notably, the same local actors get to decide which 
cases qualify for consolidation in the first place.338 
Table 4 summarizes judicial selection methods in states with peer MDL 
systems. The potential concern with extraterritorial control seems more acute 
in those peer states in which trial judges are elected by local constituencies. 
In these states, trial judges are supposed to represent particular jurisdictions, 
but the peer MDL systems allow a locally elected judge to exercise control 
over cases in other judges’ purviews. The concern seems less acute in states 
where trial judges are appointed by statewide actors. In these states, trial 
judges may not be designed to be responsive to local interests (and could not 
be voted out for going against local sentiment). In that sense they look more 
like federal judges. 
TABLE 4: JUDICIAL SELECTION METHODS IN PEER MDL STATES339 
State MDL Decider 
Trial Judge 
Selection 
Indiana First-filed judge Partisan election 
Maine Any judge with pending case 
Appointed by 
governor 
Massachusetts First-filed judge 
Appointed by 
governor 
New Hampshire Any judge with pending case 
Appointed by 
governor 
Pennsylvania First-filed judge Partisan election 








Both institutional and peer models of MDL, therefore, are exceptions 
to the normal allocation of judicial business in a state. Or, to put it another 
way, the model that most closely tracks the background distribution of 
judicial authority throughout the state appears to be the states that have no 
MDL procedure. If local judges keep control over their cases, then the 
designed intrastate variation is preserved. Of course, that model gives up the 
 
 338 Wisconsin’s requirement of a joint order blunts this concern by empowering both the sending and 
receiving judges, though it seemingly does so at a cost to efficiency. See supra notes 78–79 and 
accompanying text. 
 339 See supra Section I.B; NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS., supra note 49 (maintaining information on 
MDL decider and trial judge selection in the states). 
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efficiency gains of aggregated proceedings. States must decide what degree 
of local control and geographic variance they want in their judicial systems 
and how much they are willing to trade that off against values like efficiency 
and statewide uniformity. 
We do not mean to suggest that any particular combination of policies 
on local control and MDL design is better than any other. Instead, we want 
to emphasize that these are choices and that policymakers should make them 
consciously—something that our review of legislative histories suggests that 
they do not always do. 
D. Federal–State Competition 
The foregoing sections suggest that intrastate dynamics are central to 
state MDL design choices. And, again, it is worth noting that many state 
MDL proceedings involve disputes that are primarily or exclusively within 
a state. 
But, of course, many large disputes spill over state lines, and although 
federal MDLs tend to vacuum up most cases in a mass-tort proceeding, there 
continue to be cases with federal and state components.340 As noted above, 
we have not found evidence of states adopting or designing MDL procedures 
in order to capture a share of these cases.341 Yet even if they were created for 
other reasons, we find that the presence of state MDLs can lead to 
competition between federal and state proceedings. And, as federal MDL 
continues to increase in importance, we suspect that these federal–state 
dynamics will become even more important to the complex litigation 
landscape. 
More precisely, the existence of state MDLs operating alongside a 
federal MDL has consequences for the distribution of power within disputes. 
When state or federal courts consolidate disputes, there is an accompanying 
tendency to consolidate representation. In the typical mass tort, this will 
mean consolidating representation on the plaintiffs’ side.342 This could take 
the form of formal appointments (e.g., “lead counsel”) or informal efforts 
among plaintiffs’ counsel to work together on joint filings.343 Though MDL 
does not require such consolidation344—and such consolidation is possible 
 
 340 See, e.g., Bradt & Rave, Aggregation on Defendants’ Terms, supra note 88, at 1299–1306 
(discussing MDL’s implications and the increased federalization of litigation). 
 341 See supra Section III.A. 
 342 See Bradt & Rave, Aggregation on Defendants’ Terms, supra note 88, at 1260. 
 343 See, e.g., FED. JUD. CTR., MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, FOURTH § 10.22–.221 (2004).  
 344 See 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (providing no rules for consolidating representation).  
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outside of MDL345—we think that the choice to create MDL procedures in a 
state will almost certainly increase the frequency with which this happens. 
The costs and benefits of representational consolidation within a single 
proceeding are well known and often debated, so we need not rehash them 
here.346 But where things get more interesting is when the opportunities for 
consolidation exist across multiple court systems addressing the same 
dispute. Here, the most striking effects will be when there is a federal MDL 
with satellite cases in the states. In a world without state MDLs, those 
satellite cases may be scattered across thousands of state courthouses, with 
collective-action problems weakening their ability to affect the wider 
litigation. But when those disputes may be consolidated in state MDLs, then 
the state proceedings have the capacity to become competing power centers 
vis-à-vis the federal litigation.347 
These competing power centers may help check the considerable power 
of lead counsel in the federal MDL if different lawyers take the lead in state 
proceedings.348 Indeed, in other work, we find evidence of this dynamic in 
 
 345 See, e.g., Howard M. Erichson, Informal Aggregation: Procedural and Ethical Implications of 
Coordination Among Counsel in Related Lawsuits, 50 DUKE L.J. 381, 383–86 (2000) (providing 
examples of informal aggregation and analyzing the implications); Deborah R. Hensler & Mark A. 
Peterson, Understanding Mass Personal Injury Litigation: A Socio-Legal Analysis, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 
961, 1029–30 (1993) (highlighting the courts’ initial use of “ad hoc, informal aggregative procedures” to 
manage mass tort litigation before accepting the use of MDL); see also 15 U.S.C. § 78u–4(a)(3) 
(discussing the appointment of lead plaintiffs under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act).  
 346 Among the many, many potential sources discussing these costs and benefits, see generally 
Robert M. Cover, The Uses of Jurisdictional Redundancy: Interest, Ideology, and Innovation, 22 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 639, 642 (1981); Francis E. McGovern, Toward a Functional Approach for Managing 
Complex Litigation, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 440, 484–87 (1986) [hereinafter McGovern, Toward a Functional 
Approach]; Francis E. McGovern, Resolving Mature Mass Tort Litigation, 69 B.U. L. REV. 659, 671–75 
(1989) [hereinafter McGovern, Resolving Mature Mass Tort Litigation]; Martin H. Redish, Intersystemic 
Redundancy and Federal Court Power: Proposing a Zero Tolerance Solution to the Duplicative 
Litigation Problem, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1347 (2000); RICHARD A. NAGAREDA, MASS TORTS IN A 
WORLD OF SETTLEMENT (2007); Alexandra D. Lahav, Recovering the Social Value of Jurisdictional 
Redundancy, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2369 (2008); J. Maria Glover, Mass Litigation Governance in the Post-
Class Action Era: The Problems and Promise of Non-removable State Actions in Multi-district Litigation, 
5 J. TORT L. 1 (2014); Zachary D. Clopton, Redundant Public-Private Enforcement, 69 VAND. L. REV. 
285 (2016).  
 347 See Clopton & Rave, Opioid Cases and State MDLs, supra note 14, at 10–19 (documenting 
competing power centers in state opioid MDLs).  
 348 See generally, e.g., BURCH, MASS TORT DEALS, supra note 3, at 18–19 (discussing the 
appointment of “lead lawyers”); Burch, Monopolies, supra note 3, at 70–79 (proposing more competition 
among MDL lead lawyers in order to balance out their monopolistic control); Burch & Williams, supra 
note 3, at 1459 (explaining why “lead lawyers” in MDL are often repeat players). As an intermediate 
form of consolidation outside of the federal MDL, state MDLs may also serve as a (limited) backstop 
against the powerful federal transferee judge. If, for example, a federal MDL judge favors defendants too 
much, later filing plaintiffs may attempt to plead their cases in ways that avoid federal jurisdiction. Or, if 
the federal MDL judge makes both sides uncomfortable, the parties might even dismiss and refile cases 
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the opioid litigation—with many lawyers from outside the federal MDL 
leadership playing important roles in state opioid MDL proceedings.349 On 
this issue, the variation in state MDL designs described above has an 
unintended consequence. Because the methods of consolidating and 
assigning state MDLs vary, it becomes challenging for the same group of 
lawyers to win leadership contests in all of the proceedings.350 Or to put it 
another way, enterprising plaintiffs’ firms that might not have the national 
reputation to be selected to federal MDL leadership can maneuver into 
leadership positions in one or more states. Once there, and armed with 
effective control over an inventory of state cases, these lawyers can exert real 
influence on the course of the overall litigation and potential settlement.351 
To be sure, the more cases that flow into state courts and away from 
federal MDLs, the more collective-action problems plaintiffs may encounter. 
In that sense, state MDLs are no panacea. State MDLs may sometimes help 
limit the agency problem in federal MDLs, but doing so may exacerbate 
collective-action problems in litigation and may make it harder to obtain 
global peace.352 
E. Interjurisdictional Cooperation 
Finally, alongside the potential for interjurisdictional competition, we 
find that state MDLs may be sites for increased interjurisdictional 
cooperation. 
Some of this cooperation might be indirect. Because different states 
employ different MDL procedures, there may be opportunities for 
policymakers and judges to learn from each other. Indeed, we have found 
evidence of state policymakers learning from each other and from the federal 
 
in state court, with the defendants eschewing removal. Once there, the ability to use state MDL means 
that the parties still may obtain some benefits of consolidation outside of the control of the federal MDL 
judge. See Clopton & Rave, Opioid Cases and State MDLs, supra note 14, at 20.  
 349 See Clopton & Rave, Opioid Cases and State MDLs, supra note 14, at 8–10, 18–19.  
 350 We find this effect in opioids, too. See id. at 8–10, 14.  
 351 That said, competition between state and federal leadership runs counter to the cooperation we 
describe infra. 
 352 We explore these tradeoffs in the opioid litigation in Clopton & Rave, Opioid Cases and State 
MDLs, supra note 14, at 11–17.  
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system,353 and we have been told that state judges handling complex cases 
are in communication about best practices.354 
More directly, state MDLs can facilitate intercourt cooperation on 
actual cases. In particular, we think that state MDLs can play an important 
role when parties and courts want the benefits of consolidation while also 
preferring or needing to be in state court.355 
Imagine that a defective product leads to a federal MDL of 10,000 cases 
plus 20 cases in each of ten states.356 Parties in those state cases may be 
content to be in state court or may be stuck there because federal jurisdiction 
is lacking, but they also would benefit from some coordination with the 
federal cases and with each other. In simpler terms, coordination problems 
are much easier to overcome when dealing with 11 proceedings than when 
dealing with 201 proceedings. Consolidation of the state proceedings in state 
MDLs reduces the nodes for coordination. More generally, if every state 
consolidated all of their cases related to a federal MDL, no federal MDL 
would face more than 50 satellite proceedings. Consolidation maximalists 
 
 353 See, e.g., supra Section II.A (recounting Texas legislative history referencing California and 
Colorado MDL systems as potential models); ILL. SUP. CT. R. 384, Committee Comment (“This rule is 
new and is based upon Title 28, section 1407, of the United States Code, which establishes the procedure 
in the Federal courts for the transfer of civil actions involving one or more common questions of fact, 
pending in different districts, to one district for coordination or consolidated pretrial proceedings.”). 
 354 See Kuhl Interview, supra note 162. Another type of learning might be within the same litigation. 
For decades, scholars and judges have observed that serial proceedings in mass tort cases—the process 
of “maturation”—can help inform a global resolution. See McGovern, Toward a Functional Approach, 
supra note 346, at 482–83; McGovern, Resolving Mature Mass Tort Litigation, supra note 346; 
NAGAREDA, supra note 346, at viii. Spreading those across multiple courts or court systems may have 
added benefits in this process. See, e.g., McGovern & Rave, supra note 320 (manuscript at 1–2, 16) 
(disaggregating MDL proceedings into “spoke” jurisdictions “can increase the pool of cases eligible for 
bellwether treatment”); Glover, supra note 346, at 25–42 (arguing that state court proceedings alongside 
federal MDLs can produce “real-world data” relevant to the resolution of the federal cases); Lahav, supra 
note 346, at 2387 (discussing the benefits and drawbacks of informal discussions between judges in 
aggregated cases and how such communication can make a global peace possible without class 
certification); Cover, supra note 346, at 673–74, 678 (explaining the increase in innovation that is possible 
with interjurisdictional communication). 
 355 We do not, for example, go as far as George Conway in his pre-Twitter days, who advocated for 
amendments to § 1407 to allow the federal MDL Panel to consolidate cases in state courts if it so chose. 
See George T. Conway III, The Consolidation of Multistate Litigation in State Courts, 96 YALE L.J. 1099, 
1107–12 (1987) (proposing that the federal MDL Panel should be authorized to transfer consolidated 
cases to a single state court). Conway is more well known for his views on other topics. See George 
Conway (@gtconway3d), TWITTER, https://twitter.com/gtconway3d [https://perma.cc/3VZ2-P4K8]. Nor 
do we advocate for (or against) the adoption of an interstate transfer rule for related cases. See UNIF. 
TRANSFER OF LITIG. ACT (NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’NRS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 1991) (providing, among 
other things, for transfer between state court systems of related cases). 
 356 For the uninitiated, a federal MDL of 10,000 is unusual but not so rare. See Statistical Information, 
U.S. JUD. PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIG., https://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/statistics-info 
[https://perma.cc/A8G3-FFW8].  
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might think that 50 satellite proceedings are 50 proceedings too many, but it 
is a marked change from a world in which there could be satellite cases in 
every state trial court around the country. 
The opportunity for intermediate levels of consolidation may have 
positive effects for parties and courts. State MDLs mean that parties may 
obtain some of the benefits of coordination even when cases remain in state 
courts. Indeed, states adopting MDL systems frequently did so in order to 
obtain the benefits of coordination and case management.357 State court 
coordination also allows state judges to remain active players in cases 
involving state law without sacrificing all of the benefits of consolidation.358 
And perhaps federal courts might be more willing to remand removed cases 
that belong in state court because not all benefits of coordination will be 
lost.359 
Assuming that judicial cooperation is a good thing, then our analysis of 
state MDLs suggests at least two things. First, if state MDLs improve 
cooperation, then states adopting and amending MDL procedures could 
realize those benefits by expressly providing that the existence of 
coordinated proceedings in other jurisdictions should counsel in favor of 
consolidation. And, indeed, New Jersey and New York currently do so.360 
We also found that there are federal MDL counterparts to more than half of 
the California consolidated products liability proceedings,361 and in 86% of 
the products liability cases in Texas.362 
Second, state and federal judges handling coordinated proceedings 
could be encouraged to coordinate with one another. Federal MDL judges 
routinely coordinate with state court cases, either by communicating directly 
 
 357 See supra Sections II.A, II.B. (describing the goals of the California and Texas systems). 
 358 Note that one criticism of federal MDL is that it thwarts the development of state law by imposing 
flattened-out standards on multistate cases. See Samuel Issacharoff & Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, The 
Hollowed Out Common Law, 67 UCLA L. REV. 600 (2020); cf. Bradt & Rave, Aggregation on 
Defendants’ Terms, supra note 88, at 1308–11 (observing that MDL can result in smoothing out of 
differences in state law). 
 359 Note, too, that another criticism of federal MDL is that MDL judges sometimes sit on remand 
motions in hopes of global resolution. See Clopton & Rave, supra note 14, at 20 (discussing this issue in 
the opioid MDL).  
 360 See supra Section I.C. 
 361 Results on file with authors. Examples of pairs of overlapping California proceedings and federal 
MDLs include: Abilify Prod. Cases, JCCP No. 4998, and In re Abilify (Aripiprazole) Prods. Liab. Litig., 
232 F. Supp. 3d 1342 (J.P.M.L. 2016); Zostavax Prod. Cases, JCCP No. 4962, and In re Zostavax (Zoster 
Vaccine Live) Prods. Liab. Litig., 330 F. Supp. 3d 1378 (J.P.M.L. 2018); Roundup Prods. Cases, JCCP 
No. 4953, and In re Roundup Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 2741, 2020 WL 5865873 (J.P.M.L. Oct. 1, 
2020); Onglyza Prod. Cases, JCCP No. 4909, and In re Onglyza (Saxagliptin) & Kombiglyze XR 
(Saxagliptin & Metformin) Prods. Liab. Litig., 289 F. Supp. 3d 1357 (J.P.M.L. 2018). 
 362 Rave & Clopton, Texas MDL, supra note 10, at 381–84.  
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with state judges or by instructing counsel to coordinate with their state court 
counterparts.363 This is a project worth encouraging, and state MDLs can help 
do that. Simply by reducing the number of proceedings to coordinate, state 
MDLs can facilitate these court-to-court efforts.364 In addition, because 
institutional state MDLs can funnel cases to handpicked judges who might 
have special experience in complex litigation, we might expect those court-
to-court efforts to be even more welcome.365 
To take just one example, in the Vioxx litigation, Judge Eldon Fallon, 
who was handling the federal MDL, worked closely with well-respected 
state judges Victoria Chaney and Carol Higbee. Judges Chaney and Higbee, 
respectively, were handling the state MDL proceedings in California and 
New Jersey.366 While we cannot say that state MDL procedures were 
necessary for this coordination, it certainly helped that Judges Chaney and 
Higbee had substantial masses of claims in front of them. 
Or consider the opioid litigation.367 Nine states have consolidated 
hundreds of state court opioid claims in state MDLs: California,368 
 
 363 For example, the JPML has a link on its website for “Multijurisdiction Litigation Guide -- Federal 
and State Coordination,” see Legal Resources, U.S. JUD. PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIG., 
https://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/legal-resources [https://perma.cc/8UQZ-849X], and the Manual for 
Complex Litigation takes up federal–state coordination as well. See infra note 364. For an example from 
another area, the U.S. Bankruptcy Code (under the influence of the UNCITRAL Model Law) empowers 
bankruptcy judges “to communicate directly with, or to request information or assistance directly from, 
a foreign court.” 11 U.S.C. § 1525; see UNCITRAL MODEL L. ON CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY WITH 
GUIDE TO ENACTMENT, art. 25, para. 1 (U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE L. (UNCITRAL) 1997), enacted 
by G.A. Res. 52/158 (Dec. 15, 1997). 
 364 For example, state and federal MDL judges can even appoint the same lawyers to leadership 
positions in both proceedings, as the Manual for Complex Litigation suggests. FED. JUD. CTR., MANUAL 
FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 10.225 (2004). But as we noted above, there are costs to 
overlapping appointments as well. See supra Section III.D.  
 365 We do not mean to suggest that handpicking judges is all upside, but only that there may be 
something to be gained from repeated interactions among state and federal judges handling complex 
cases. 
 366 See, e.g., In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., No. MDL 1657, 2010 WL 724084, at *2 (E.D. La. Feb. 
18, 2010); Susan Todd, Inside the Vioxx Litigation, NJ.COM (Apr. 2, 2019), https://www.nj.com/ 
business/2007/11/inside_the_vioxx_litigation.html [https://perma.cc/G88H-DRNV].  
 367 For more detail on opioid cases in state MDLs, see Clopton & Rave, Opioid Cases and State 
MDLs, supra note 14.  
 368 See Cal. Jud. Council Coordination Proc. Log (on file with journal).  
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Connecticut,369 Illinois,370 Massachusetts,371 New York,372 Pennsylvania,373 
Texas,374 South Carolina,375 and West Virginia.376 These state-level 
consolidations may be particularly important in dealing with the opioid crisis 
because many of the plaintiffs are public entities. State MDLs create 
opportunities for cooperation among courts and litigants without requiring 
public-entity plaintiffs and state attorneys general, who might have a special 
interest in remaining in state court, to submit to federal jurisdiction.377 And 
we have reason to believe that many of the judges handling these state MDLs 
have been in contact with and are coordinating with the federal MDL judge. 
We hasten to remind readers that state MDLs are more than just 
adjuncts to federal MDL. Although many large products liability disputes 
have state and federal court components, there are many examples of 
complex litigation that reside exclusively within the jurisdiction of a single 
state court system. Our review of the California and Texas data confirms this 
intuition. And especially in large states such as those, intercourt coordination 
is important even when no other judicial system is involved. So, again, state 
MDLs can be important sites of interjurisdictional cooperation, but they also 
are important intrajurisdictionally as well. 
CONCLUSION 
In the decades since Congress adopted the federal MDL statute, more 
and more states have adopted procedures to coordinate cases across state 
courts. And there is some evidence that even more states might join their 
ranks soon. 
 
 369 See, e.g., City of New Haven v. Purdue Pharma, L.P., No. X07HHDCV176086134S, 2019 WL 
423990 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 8, 2019).  
 370 See People v. Purdue Pharma L.P., Order No. 123090 (Ill. Jan. 29, 2018) (on file with journal).  
 371 See, e.g., City of Bos. v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. 1884-CV-02860, 2020 WL 2198026 (Mass. 
Super. Ct. Feb. 10, 2020). 
 372 See Order Granting Defendants’ Application to Coordinate Cases and for Partial Stay Pursuant to 
22 NYCRR 202.69, County of Suffolk v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. 613760/2016, 2017 WL 11421786 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. July 19, 2017). 
 373 See Delaware County v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. 17-8095 (Pa. Ct. C.P. Mar. 26, 2018) (on file 
with journal).  
 374 See MDL Pretrial Cause No. 2018-77098, Master File No. 2018-63587 (Tex. Dist. Ct. June 6, 
2019) (on file with journal). 
 375 See Am. Order RE: Opioid Litig. (S.C. Aug. 23, 2018), https://www.sccourts.org/ 
courtOrders/displayOrder.cfm?orderNo=2018-08-23-01 [https://perma.cc/QHJ4-QAUU]. 
 376 See Opioid Litigation, W. VA. JUDICIARY (Nov. 19, 2020), http://www.courtswv.gov/lower-
courts/mlp/opioid.html [https://perma.cc/489Q-UQQF] (collecting documents). 
 377 See, e.g., Roger Michalski, MDL Immunity: Lessons from the National Prescription Opiate 
Litigation, 69 AM. U. L. REV. 175, 235–46 (2019) (arguing for an exemption from MDL consolidation 
for cases brought by or against public litigants).  
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This Article is not meant to be a paean to state MDLs, but rather an 
acknowledgment that they play an important role in American complex 
litigation and will continue to do so. Detailed and critical study of their 
design and operation, therefore, will play an important role too. 
APPENDIX A: STATE MDL RULES, STATUTES, AND STANDARDS 
Table A1 provides citations to the statutes and rules creating MDL 
procedures in the states. Table A2 provides the standards that institutional 
and peer MDL states use to decide whether to consolidate cases. 
TABLE A1: STATE MDL RULES AND STATUTES 
State Category Citation 
Alabama None N/A 
Alaska None N/A 
Arizona None N/A 
Arkansas None N/A 
California Institutional 
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 404–404.9 (West 
2020); CAL. R. CT. 3.501–3.545 
Colorado Institutional COLO. R. CIV. P. 42.1 
Connecticut Institutional CONN. GEN. STAT. § 51-347b (2019) 
Delaware None N/A 
Florida None N/A 
Georgia None N/A 
Hawaii None N/A 
Idaho None N/A 
Illinois Institutional ILL. SUP. CT. R. 384 
Indiana Peer IND. R. TRIAL P. 42(D) 
Iowa None N/A 
Kansas Institutional KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-242(c) (2014) 
Kentucky None N/A 
Louisiana None N/A 
Maine Peer 
ME. R. CIV. P. 42; ME. STAT. tit. 14, § 508 
(2019) 
Maryland None N/A 
Massachusetts Peer MASS. SUPER. CT. R. 31 
Michigan Ad hoc 
In re Microsoft Antitrust Litig., Admin. Order 
No. 2000-5 (Mich. 2000); In re Silicone Gel 
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State Category Citation 
Breast Implants Litig., Admin Order No. 
1993-2 (Mich. 1993) 
Minnesota Institutional MINN. GEN. R. PRAC. 113.03 
Mississippi None N/A 
Missouri None N/A 
Montana None N/A 
Nebraska None N/A 
Nevada None N/A 
New Hampshire Peer N.H. SUPER. CT. R. 12(b) 
New Jersey Institutional N.J. CT. R. 4:38A 
New Mexico None N/A 
New York Institutional UNIF. R. N.Y. STATE TRIAL CTS. § 202.69 
North Carolina Institutional N.C. GEN. R. PRAC. SUPER. & DIST. CTS. 2.1 
North Dakota None N/A 
Ohio None N/A 
Oklahoma Ad hoc 
In re Okla. Breast Implant Cases, 847 P.2d 
772 (Okla. 1993) 
Oregon Institutional 
OR. R. CIV. P. 32K; 
OR. R. APP. P. 12.15 
Pennsylvania Peer PA. R. CIV. P. 213, 213.1 
Rhode Island Peer R.I. SUPER. CT. R. CIV. P. 42(a) 
South Carolina Ad hoc 
See In re Breast Implant Prod. Liab. Litig., 
503 S.E.2d 445 (S.C. 1998) 
South Dakota None N/A 
Tennessee Ad hoc TENN. SHELBY CNTY. CT. R. 28 
Texas Institutional 
TEX. GOV’T. CODE ANN. § 74.161 et seq. 
(West 2019);  
TEX. R. JUD. ADMIN. 13 
Utah None N/A 
Vermont None N/A 
Virginia Institutional 
VA. CODE. ANN. §§ 8.01-267.1 to 267.9 
(2020) 
Washington None N/A 
West Virginia Institutional 
W. VA. R. CIV. P. 42(b); 
W. VA. TRIAL CT. R. 26 
Wisconsin Peer WIS. STAT. § 805.05(1)(b) (2020) 
Wyoming None N/A 
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TABLE A2: STANDARDS FOR CONSOLIDATION IN INSTITUTIONAL AND PEER STATE MDL 
State Standard for Consolidation 
California 
“Coordination of civil actions sharing a common question 
of fact or law is appropriate if one judge hearing all of the 
actions for all purposes in a selected site or sites will 
promote the ends of justice taking into account whether the 
common question of fact or law is predominating and 
significant to the litigation; the convenience of parties, 
witnesses, and counsel; the relative development of the 
actions and the work product of counsel; the efficient 
utilization of judicial facilities and manpower; the calendar 
of the courts; the disadvantages of duplicative and 
inconsistent rulings, orders, or judgments; and, the 
likelihood of settlement of the actions without further 
litigation should coordination be denied.” CAL. CIV. PROC. 
CODE § 404.1 (West 2020). 
Colorado 
“Transfer of civil actions sharing a common question of 
law or fact is appropriate if one judge hearing all of the 
actions will promote the ends of justice and the just and 
efficient conduct of such actions. The factors to be 
considered shall include, but shall not be limited to, the 
following: (1) whether the common question of fact or law 
is predominating and significant to the litigation; (2) the 
convenience of the parties, witnesses and counsel; (3) the 
relative development of the action and the work product of 
counsel; (4) the efficient utilization of judicial facilities and 
manpower; (5) the calendar of the courts; (6) the 
disadvantages of duplicative and inconsistent rulings, 
orders or judgments; and (7) the likelihood of settlement of 
the actions without further litigation should transfer be 
denied.” COLO. R. CIV. P. 42.1(g). 
Connecticut 
“[W]hen required for the efficient operation of the courts 
and to insure the prompt and proper administration of 
justice.” CONN. GEN. STAT. § 51-347b(a) (2019). 
Illinois 
“When civil actions involving one or more common 
questions of fact or law are pending in different judicial 
circuits, and the Supreme Court determines that 
consolidation would serve the convenience of the parties 
and witnesses and would promote the just and efficient 
conduct of such actions.” ILL. SUP. CT. R. 384(a). 
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State Standard for Consolidation 
Indiana 
“When civil actions involving a common question of law 
or fact are pending in different courts, a party to any of the 
actions may, by motion, request consolidation of those 
actions for the purpose of discovery and any pre-trial 
proceedings.” IND. R. TRIAL P. 42(D). 
Kansas 
“When civil actions arising out of the same transaction or 
occurrence or series of transactions or occurrences are 
pending in different judicial districts, the supreme court, on 
request of a party or of any court in which one of the 
actions is pending and upon finding that a transfer and 
consolidation will promote the just and efficient conduct of 
the actions, may order transfer of the pending actions to 
one of the counties in which an action is pending.” KAN. 
STAT. ANN. 60-242(c)(1) (2014). 
Maine 
“When actions involving a common question of law or fact 
are pending before the court, in the same county or 
division or a different county or division, it may order a 
joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the 
actions; it may order all the actions consolidated; and it 
may make such orders concerning proceedings therein as 
may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay . . . . In 
making any order under this rule, the court shall give due 
regard to the convenience of parties and witnesses and the 
interests of justice.” ME. R. CIV. P. 42(a), (c); see also ME. 
STAT. tit. 14, § 508 (2019) (“A presiding Justice of the 
Superior Court may, in the interests of justice and to secure 
the speedy trial of an action, or for other good cause, 
transfer any civil action or proceeding from the Superior 
Court in one county to another county. The Chief Justice of 
the Superior Court may, in the interests of justice and to 
secure the speedy trial of actions and the efficient 
scheduling of trials, or for other good cause, transfer any 
number of civil actions or proceedings from the Superior 
Court in one county to another county. Transfer may also 
be by consent of all parties to any civil action or 
proceeding, provided that the prior approval of the Chief 
Justice of the Superior Court is obtained.”). 
Massachusetts 
“When actions involving a common question of law or fact 
are pending before the court, in the same county or 
different counties, it may order a joint hearing or trial of 
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State Standard for Consolidation 
any or all the matters in issue in the actions; it may order 
all the actions consolidated; and it may make such orders 
concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid 
unnecessary costs or delay.” MASS. R. CIV. P. 42(a); see 
also MASS. SUPER. CT. R. 31 (incorporating Rule 41(a)’s 
standard by reference). 
Minnesota 
“When two or more cases pending in more than one 
judicial district involve one or more common questions of 
fact or are otherwise related cases in which there is a 
special need for or desirability of central or coordinated 
judicial management, a motion by a party or a court’s 
request for assignment of the cases to a single judge may 
be made to the chief justice of the Supreme Court.” MINN. 
GEN. R. PRAC. 113.03(a). 
New Hampshire 
“Whenever a Motion is filed in any county requesting the 
transfer of an action there pending to another county for 
trial with an action there pending, arising out of the same 
transaction or event or involving common issues of law, 
and/or fact, the court may, after notice to all parties in all 
such pending actions and hearing, make such order for 
consolidation in any one of such counties in which such 
actions are pending, as justice and convenience require.” 
N.H. SUPER. CT. R. 12(b). 
New Jersey 
“In determining whether designation as multicounty 
litigation is warranted, the following factors, among others, 
will be considered:  
whether the case(s) possess(es) the following 
characteristics: 
it involves large numbers of parties; 
it involves many claims with common, recurrent 
issues of law and fact that are associated with a single 
product, mass disaster, or complex environmental or toxic 
tort; 
there is geographical dispersement of parties; 
there is a high degree of commonality of injury or 
damages among plaintiffs; 
there is a value interdependence between different 
claims, that is, the perceived strength or weakness of the 
causation and liability aspects of the case(s) are often 
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State Standard for Consolidation 
dependent upon the success or failure of similar lawsuits in 
other jurisdictions; and 
there is a degree of remoteness between the court and 
actual decisionmakers in the litigation, that is, even the 
simplest of decisions may be required to pass through 
layers of local, regional, national, general and house 
counsel. 
whether there is a risk that centralization may 
unreasonably delay the progress, increase the expense, or 
complicate the processing of any action, or otherwise 
prejudice a party; 
whether centralized management is fair and 
convenient to the parties, witnesses and counsel; 
whether there is a risk of duplicative and inconsistent 
rulings, orders or judgments if the cases are not managed 
in a coordinated fashion; 
whether coordinated discovery would be 
advantageous; 
whether the cases require specialized expertise and 
case processing as provided by the dedicated multicounty 
litigation judge and staff; 
whether centralization would result in the efficient 
utilization of judicial resources and the facilities and 
personnel of the court; 
whether issues of insurance, limits on assets and 
potential bankruptcy can be best addressed in coordinated 
proceedings; and 
whether there are related matters pending in Federal 
court or in other state courts that require coordination with 
a single New Jersey judge.” GLENN A. GRANT, 
MULTICOUNTY LITIGATION GUIDELINES AND CRITERIA FOR 
DESIGNATION (REVISED) 1–2 (2019); see also N.J. CT. R. 
4:38-1 (providing for consolidation of actions). 
New York 
“In determining whether to issue an administrative order of 
coordination, the Panel shall consider, among other things, 
the complexity of the actions; whether common questions 
of fact or law exist, and the importance of such questions 
to the determination of the issues; the risk that coordination 
may unreasonably delay the progress, increase the expense, 
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or complicate the processing of any action or otherwise 
prejudice a party; the risk of duplicative or inconsistent 
rulings, orders or judgments; the convenience of the 
parties, witnesses and counsel; whether coordinated 
discovery would be advantageous; efficient utilization of 
judicial resources and the facilities and personnel of the 
court; the manageability of a coordinated litigation; 
whether issues of insurance, limits on assets and potential 
bankruptcy can be best addressed in coordinated 
proceedings; and the pendency of related matters in the 
Federal courts and in the courts of other states. The Panel 
may exclude particular actions from an otherwise 
applicable order of coordination when necessary to protect 
the rights of parties.” UNIF. R. N.Y. STATE TRIAL CTS. 
§ 202.69(b)(3). 
North Carolina 
“Factors which may be considered in determining whether 
to make such designations include: the number and diverse 
interests of the parties; the amount and nature of 
anticipated pretrial discovery and motions; whether the 
parties voluntarily agree to waive venue for hearing pretrial 
motions; the complexity of the evidentiary matters and 
legal issues involved; whether it will promote the efficient 
administration of justice; and such other matters as the 
Chief Justice shall deem appropriate.” N.C. GEN. R. PRAC. 
SUPER. & DIST. CTS. 2.1(d). 
Oregon 
“Coordination of class actions sharing a common question 
of fact or law is appropriate if one judge hearing all of the 
actions for all purposes in a selected site or sites will 
promote the ends of justice taking into account whether the 
common question of fact or law is predominating and 
significant to the litigation; the convenience of parties, 
witnesses, and counsel; the relative development of the 
actions and the work product of counsel; the efficient 
utilization of judicial facilities and personnel; the calendar 
of the courts; the disadvantages of duplicative and 
inconsistent rulings, orders, or judgments; and the 
likelihood of settlement of the actions without further 
litigation should coordination be denied.” OR. R. CIV. P. 
32K(1)(b). 
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Pennsylvania 
“In actions pending in different counties which involve a 
common question of law or fact or which arise from the 
same transaction or occurrence, any party, with notice to 
all other parties, may file a motion requesting the court in 
which a complaint was first filed to order coordination of 
the actions. Any party may file an answer to the motion 
and the court may hold a hearing.” PA. R. CIV. P. 213.1(a). 
“In determining whether to order coordination and which 
location is appropriate for the coordinated proceedings, the 
court shall consider, among other matters: (1) whether the 
common question of fact or law is predominating and 
significant to the litigation; (2) the convenience of the 
parties, witnesses and counsel; (3) whether coordination 
will result in unreasonable delay or expense to a party or 
otherwise prejudice a party in an action which would be 
subject to coordination; (4) the efficient utilization of 
judicial facilities and personnel and the just and efficient 
conduct of the actions; (5) the disadvantages of duplicative 
and inconsistent rulings, orders or judgments; (6) the 
likelihood of settlement of the actions without further 
litigation should coordination be denied.” Id. 213.1(c). 
Rhode Island 
“When actions involving a common question of law or fact 
are pending before the court, in the same county or 
different counties, the court may order a joint hearing or 
trial of any or all the matters in issue in the actions; it may 
order all the actions consolidated; and it may make such 
orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to 
avoid unnecessary costs or delay.” R.I. SUPER. CT. R. CIV. 
P. 42(a). 
Texas 
“[T]he judicial panel on multidistrict litigation may 
transfer civil actions involving one or more common 
questions of fact pending in the same or different 
constitutional courts, county courts at law, probate courts, 
or district courts to any district court for consolidated or 
coordinated pretrial proceedings, including summary 
judgment or other dispositive motions, but not for trial on 
the merits. A transfer may be made by the judicial panel on 
multidistrict litigation on its determination that the transfer 
will: (1) be for the convenience of the parties and 
witnesses; and (2) promote the just and efficient conduct of 
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the actions.” TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 74.162 (West 
2019) 
Virginia 
“On motion of any party, a circuit court may enter an order 
joining, coordinating, consolidating or transferring civil 
actions as provided in this chapter upon finding that: 
1. Separate civil actions brought by six or more 
plaintiffs involve common questions of law or fact and 
arise out of the same transaction, occurrence or series of 
transactions or occurrences; 
2. The common questions of law or fact predominate 
and are significant to the actions; and 
3. The order (i) will promote the ends of justice and 
the just and efficient conduct and disposition of the 
actions, and (ii) is consistent with each party’s right to due 
process of law, and (iii) does not prejudice each individual 
party’s right to a fair and impartial resolution of each 
action. 
Factors to be considered by the court include, but are 
not limited to, (i) the nature of the common questions of 
law or fact; (ii) the convenience of the parties, witnesses 
and counsel; (iii) the relative stages of the actions and the 
work of counsel; (iv) the efficient utilization of judicial 
facilities and personnel; (v) the calendar of the courts; (vi) 
the likelihood and disadvantages of duplicative and 
inconsistent rulings, orders or judgments; (vii) the 
likelihood of prompt settlement of the actions without the 
entry of the order; and (viii) as to joint trials by jury, the 
likelihood of prejudice or confusion.” VA. CODE ANN. 
§ 8.01-267.1 (2020). 
West Virginia 
“Two (2) or more civil actions pending in one or more 
circuit courts: (1) involving common questions of law or 
fact in mass accidents or single catastrophic events in 
which a number of people are injured; or (2) involving 
common questions of law or fact in ‘personal injury mass 
torts’ implicating numerous claimants in connection with 
widely available or mass-marketed products and their 
manufacture, design, use, implantation, ingestion, or 
exposure; or (3) involving common questions of law or 
fact in ‘property damage mass torts’ implicating numerous 
claimants in connection with claims for replacement or 
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repair of allegedly defective products, including those in 
which claimants seek compensation for the failure of the 
product to perform as intended with resulting damage to 
the product itself or other property, with or without 
personal injury overtones; or (4) involving common 
questions of law or fact in ‘economic loss’ cases 
implicating numerous claimants asserting defect claims 
similar to those in property damage circumstances which 
are in the nature of consumer fraud or warranty actions on 
a grand scale including allegations of the existence of a 
defect without actual product failure or injury; or (5) 
involving common questions of law or fact regarding harm 
or injury allegedly caused to numerous claimants by 
multiple defendants as a result of alleged nuisances or 
similar property damage causes of action.” W. VA. TR. CT. 
R. 26.04(a). 
Wisconsin 
“When actions which might have been brought as a single 
action under s. 803.04 are pending before different courts, 
any such action may be transferred upon motion of any 
party or of the court to another court where the related 
action is pending.” WIS. STAT. § 805.05(1)(b) (2020); see 
also id. § 803.04(1) (“All persons may join in one action as 
plaintiffs if they assert any right to relief jointly, severally, 
or in the alternative in respect of or arising out of the same 
transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or 
occurrences and if any question of law or fact common to 
all these persons will arise in the action.”). 
APPENDIX B: CALIFORNIA COORDINATED PROCEEDINGS DATA 
As described in the main text, we collected and analyzed data on 
petitions for civil case coordination disposed of between January 1, 2014 and 
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Coordination Motion Judges 
During the five-and-a-half-year period covered by our dataset, 49 
different motions judges granted 163 motions to coordinate.378 Table B1 lists 
the coordination motion judges who granted 2 or more motions: 









Emilie H. Elias 38 Marie S. Weiner 4 
Carolyn B. Kuhl 14 William D. Claster 3 
Ann I. Jones 10 Kevin R. Culhane 3 
Curtis E.A. Karnow 9 Kenneth R. Freeman 3 
David S. Cohn 6 George C. Hernandez 3 
Thierry P. Colaw 5 Craig G. Riemer 3 
Gail A. Andler 4 Glenda Sanders 3 
Peter R. Kirwan 4 Mary E. Wiss 3 
Eddie C. Sturgeon 4   
 
Of the coordination motion decisions, 91 (56%) were made by female 
judges and 72 (44%) by male judges. In 80 cases (49%), the chief justice 
authorized another judicial officer to select the motion judge. In 37 cases 
(23%), the chief justice selected a presumptive coordination motion judge, 
unless otherwise directed by the court’s presiding judge.379 In the remaining 
46 cases (28%), it appears that the chief justice assigned the motion judge 
directly.380 
 
 378 One could study coordination motion judges who denied motions. Data for granted motions were 
more easily collated, so we rely on this subset for our study here. 
 379 Data on file with authors. It is our understanding that this practice of judicial deference has 
developed in conjunction with Los Angeles’s Complex Litigation Program. See Kuhl Interview, supra 
note 162. The lead judge in Complex Litigation Program presumptively was the coordination motion 
judge for Los Angeles cases. See Kuhl Interview, supra note 162; see also Complex Litigation Program 
(Spring Street Courthouse), SUPER. CT. OF CAL., CNTY. OF L.A., http://www.lacourt.org/division/civil/ 
CI0042.aspx [https://perma.cc/ERR5-HHEB] (last visited Nov. 18, 2020) (describing the responsibilities 
of the Complex Litigation Program judges). 
 380 Data on file with authors. Of the motion judges selected by the chief justice, more than 80% were 
female (67 of 83). Three-quarters of those appointments (62 of 83) went to three judges: Elias (38), Kuhl 
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Transferee Counties 
Coordinated cases during our period were assigned to seventeen 
different counties. About 80% of cases were assigned to courts with 
specialized complex litigation programs to handle complex civil cases.381 We 
also inquired into the relationship between the county selected to hear the 
coordination motion and the county selected to hear the consolidated action. 
One judge reported the impression that the chief justice selected coordination 
motion judges with an eye toward the coordination trial court.382 And, indeed, 
in more than 80% of cases (133 of 163), the county selected for trial was also 
the county selected for the coordination motion. In 30 cases (18%), the 
motion was handled in a different county than the trial court.383 Table B2 lists 
the counties that handled one or more coordinated proceedings: 







Los Angeles 63 San Mateo 4 
Orange 22 Monterey 3 
San Francisco 19 Fresno 2 
Alameda 10 Contra Costa 1 
Santa Clara 9 San Joaquin 1 
Sacramento 8 Santa Barbara 1 
San Diego 8 Solano 1 
Riverside 6 Yolo 1 






(14), and Jones (10). Recall that the other appointments were made by presiding judges in the usual 
manner in which cases were assigned.  
 381 Data on file with authors. See generally Wood et al., supra note 149 (providing an overview of 
California’s complex court program).  
 382 See Kuhl Interview, supra note 162. 
 383 Data on file with authors.  
115:1649 (2021) MDL in the States 
1731 
Trial Judges 
During our period, 154 coordinated cases were assigned to 55 different 
California judges.384 We also asked three questions about these judges (in 
addition to partisanship, which is addressed in the main text). First, we 
looked at whether the chief justice selected the trial judge directly or 
delegated the task to the presiding judge to assign in the usual manner. 
Assignment to the presiding judge was by far the dominant mode; in fewer 
than 15% of cases was the trial judge selected directly.385 Second, we looked 
at the relationship between motion and trial judges. Of the 154 trial judge 
appointments, 62 (40%) were made to the judge who also served as the 
coordination motion judge. Third, we looked at gender. Of the trial judge 
assignments, 55 (36%) were to female judges and 99 (64%) were to male 
judges.386 These results are almost perfectly on par with the overall pool of 
California trial judges, which, according to a 2018 report, was 36.1% 





 384 Data on file with authors. In the other nine cases where a coordination motion was granted, the 
trial judge had not yet been selected or the information was otherwise unavailable. 
 385 We have data on this question for all 163 cases. In 139 cases, the presiding judge selected the trial 
judge. In the remaining 24 cases, it appears that the chief justice selected the trial judge. 
 386 Data on file with authors. Among the cases assigned directly by the chief justice, though, female 
coordination trial judges were assigned in 58% of cases (14 of 24). 
 387 DEMOGRAPHIC DATA, supra note 178. Race and ethnicity are more difficult to assess without 
access to judicial records. Using publicly available sources, we were able to identify only eight 
appointments to nonwhite judges, or about 5%. This is much lower than the percentage of nonwhite 
California trial judges (31.6%). See id. 
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Curtis E.A. Karnow 11 Mary E. Wiss 5 
Elihu M. Berle 10 William D. Claster 4 
Carolyn B. Kuhl 9 David S. Cohn 4 
William F. 
Highberger 
8 Kim G. Dunning 4 




Kenneth R. Freeman 6 Eddie C. Sturgeon 4 
Amy D. Hogue 6 Gail A. Andler 3 
John Shepard Wiley, 
Jr. 
6 Ann I. Jones 3 
Thierry P. Colaw 5 Maren E. Nelson 3 
Peter H. Kirwan 5   
APPENDIX C: TEXAS MDL DATA 
As described in the main text, we collected and analyzed data on all 
Texas MDL proceedings. Our period spanned from the inception of the 
Texas MDL system in September 2003 to October 2019. We report here our 
findings on the selection of judges and courts. In addition, we reported in the 
text our findings on partisanship and retransfer. The Tables and descriptions 
in this Appendix are adapted from our article Texas MDL.388 
 
Transferee Counties  
Unsurprisingly, the Texas MDL panel has tended to create MDLs in 
major population centers, like Harris, Dallas, and Tarrant Counties. But the 
panel has also transferred MDLs to small counties like Orange County and 
San Patricio County, each with fewer than 90,000 residents. Table C1 lists 
the counties that were assigned 1 or more MDLs: 
 
 
388 Rave & Clopton, Texas MDL, supra note 10, at 380–89. 
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TABLE C1: MDLS IN TRANSFEREE COUNTIES 
Transferee County MDLs Transferee County MDLs 
Harris 23 Jefferson 2 
Dallas 7 Webb 2 
Hidalgo 7 Fort Bend 1 
Tarrant 7 Montgomery 1 
Travis 5 Orange 1 
Bexar 3 Potter & Randall (jointly) 1 
Galveston 2 San Patricio 1 
 
Pretrial Judges  
The Texas MDL panel has assigned 61 MDLs to 38 different pretrial 
judges. The panel also retransferred MDLs to 5 additional judges. Table C2 
shows judges who were assigned 2 or more MDLs (including retransfers): 
TABLE C2: JUDGES ASSIGNED TWO OR MORE MDLS 
Pretrial Judge MDLs Pretrial Judge MDLs 
Mike Miller 8 Dana Womack 3 
Rose Guerra Reyna 5 Tracy Christopher 2 
David Evans 4 Lonnie Cox 2 
Sylvia Matthews 4 Mark Davidson 2 
Daryl Moore 3 Jim Jordan 2 
Robert Schaffer 3 Emily Tobolowsky 2 
John Specia 3 Jeff Walker 2 
Randy Wilson 3 R.H. Wallace 2 
 
These numbers may overstate the degree to which the Texas MDL 
Panel favors repeat players. Seven of Judge Mike Miller’s 8 MDLs were 
related insurance claims stemming from Hurricanes Ike and Dolly. Four of 
Judge Rose Guerra Reyna’s 5 MDLs arose out of severe hailstorms in South 
Texas. Two of Judge David Evans’s and Judge Sylvia Matthews’s 4 MDLs 
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apiece were related wind and hailstorm claims against State Farm, and 
another 1 of Judge Sylvia Matthews’s MDLs involved claims against a 
different insurer for the same wind and hailstorm events. 
Texas law allows former or retired judges to continue to serve in a 
judicial capacity under some circumstances.389 And Rule 13.6 of the Texas 
Rules of Judicial Administration allows the MDL panel to appoint a senior, 
former, or retired judge as an MDL pretrial judge, if that judge has been 
approved by the chief justice of the Texas supreme court.390 The panel has 
initially transferred MDLs to senior, former, or retired judges on at least eight 
occasions. It has also retransferred MDLs to such judges an additional seven 
times (sometimes, but not always, back to the same pretrial judge who was 
handling the MDL before ceasing active judicial service). 
We also considered the gender balance of transferee appointments.391 
Roughly 28% of the pretrial judges the Texas MDL panel selected were 
female and 72% were male. This represents a slightly smaller proportion of 
female MDL judges than the current proportion of Texas district judges who 
are women (37% as of September 2019).392 
Finally, we observed that on three occasions, the Texas MDL Panel has 
appointed multiple pretrial judges to hear related claims in a single MDL. 
First, in In re Farmers Insurance Company Wind/Hail Storm Litigation 
(Farmers I), the Panel transferred related cases against a single insurer 
stemming from eight major storms over a two-year period to three pretrial 
judges in three different districts around the state (Webb County, Tarrant 
County, and Harris County).393 The three pretrial judges were tasked with 
deciding all common issues together as a panel and all case-specific pretrial 
questions as individual pretrial courts.394 The Texas MDL panel subsequently 
 
 389 See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 74.003(b) (West 2019).  
 390 TEX. R. JUD. ADMIN. 13.6(a).  
 391 We were able to identify gender based on publicly available sources. Race and ethnicity are more 
difficult to assess without access to judicial records. Using publicly available sources, we were able to 
identify only 10 appointments to nonwhite judges, or about 15%. This is roughly equal to the percentage 
of nonwhite judges assigned federal MDLs in the prior study, see Clopton & Bradt, supra note 3, at 1737, 
and much lower than the percentage of nonwhite Texas district judges (29%), see Profile of Appellate 
and Trial Judges, TEX. JUD. BRANCH (Sept. 1, 2019), https://www.txcourts.gov/media/1444865/judge-
profile-sept-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/GYZ3-KJDW].  
 392 See id. 
 393 See In re Farmers Ins. Co. Wind/Hail Storm Litig., 481 S.W.3d 422, 424, 425 n.4 (Tex. J.P.M.L. 
2015); Order of Multidistrict Litig. Panel, In re Farmers Ins. Co. Wind/Hail Storm Litig., Admin. Order 
No. 14-0882 (Tex. Apr. 7, 2015), http://www.search.txcourts.gov/SearchMedia.aspx?MediaVersionID= 
062b7dcb-44b3-4408-848c-59a953fc99f8&coa=cossup&DT=DISPOSITION&MediaID=2d4080ad-
d78a-43a3-b2f9-b9b0f424a3b8 [https://perma.cc/G9XQ-P4LX]. 
 394 Id. 
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created a second Farmers MDL, Farmers II, for claims arising from storms 
in the two-year period after Farmers I and transferred the cases to the same 
three pretrial judges.395 In the third case, the panel transferred related oil and 
gas royalty litigation to two different pretrial judges in the same county.396 
  
 
 395 In re Farmers Ins. Co. Wind/Hail Storm Litig. 2, 506 S.W.3d 803, 804, 807 (Tex. J.P.M.L. 2016). 
 396 Order of Multidistrict Litig. Panel, In re Chesapeake Barnett Royalty Litig., Admin. Order No. 
15-0113 (Tex. Feb. 14, 2019), http://www.search.txcourts.gov/SearchMedia.aspx?MediaVersionID= 
7d358a5c-d139-4f4d-9573-d7c7198e7f9c&coa=cossup&DT=OTHER&MediaID=276a7687-73a1-
4595-894a-c1b664dc9eef [https://perma.cc/93L2-Y62X]. 
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